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Cook Islands
The shrinking economy was the crucial 
issue in 1996–97. The government’s 
budget policy statement accepted that 
the economy shrank a further 4.1 per-
cent during the year, following an 8 
percent drop the previous year. The 
present government, in power since 
1989, outdid its predecessors in efforts 
to make voters dependent on them and 
to politicize more forms of power. It 
achieved this largely by borrowing far 
beyond the country’s capacity to repay, 
using the money to bring more people 
onto the government payroll with little 
to do, and giving cash grants and per-
quisites to politically useful actors—
including all the main churches.
With insurmountable debt, and 
bankruptcy only one payday away, the 
Asian Development Bank was called 
on and a “structural adjustment pack-
age” devised. Cook Islands currency 
was abolished because it became dis-
credited after the government “mined” 
the reserve fund on which it was 
based. New Zealand currency was 
adopted in its place.
The public service staff was cut 
nearly sixty percent from a peak of 
3,600 to 1,593—still relatively large 
for a resident population of 18,000. 
Those who lost their jobs were offered 
three months’ pay if they joined “Tran-
sition Services” and trained for 192private-sector work or self-employ-
ment. But the head of Transition 
Services, Nga Pierre, said that many 
would not even attend interviews for 
jobs. Many private-sector jobs were 
advertised but not filled, because 
private-sector jobs involve regular 
attendance and effort, which govern-
ment jobs in most cases did not. Moti-
vation was low, as people had become 
accustomed to wide-ranging depen-
dence, including being paid without 
significant work. A few set up their 
own enterprises, but most were left ill 
equipped for initiative, responsibility, 
or self-reliance. Many people have 
some land or family they can fall back 
on in emergency, and all have the right 
to live in New Zealand and Australia 
and earn much higher amounts (which 
become a benchmark at home), 
whether from work or welfare grants.
The staff of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture was cut from 280 to 70. Few had 
realized that the ministry itself was a 
major constraint on agricultural pro-
ductivity, and those who knew had a 
vested interest in not telling. For 
decades, successes in agriculture have 
resulted from individual initiatives; 
almost every government scheme has 
failed. By the end of the year under 
review agricultural production was 
already much improved.
However, the political super-
structure remained untouched. As the 
publisher of the Cook Islands Press 
observed on 26 January, “Ministers 
run the country into the ground, every-
one loses their jobs except them.” 
Despite public calls for reductions to 
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parliament to run a community of 
18,000, their posts and privileges have 
been preserved.
Levels of integrity have also been 
tarnished. The newspaper article spoke 
of ministerial improprieties that are 
general knowledge such as “[Minister] 
Tom Marsters . . . ordering tax-paid 
workers to his private pig farm”—and 
to his taro plots. The same minister 
contracted the mowing of the interna-
tional airport to his campaign manager 
and supplied him with a government 
tractor to do it with. Minister for 
Marine Resources the Honourable 
Tepure Tapaitau granted a license for a 
pearl enterprise in which his family are 
the major Cook Islands beneficiaries. 
Such conflicts of interest and misuse of 
power are common. Former Minister 
of Marine Resources and then Cook 
Islands Commercial Consul in New 
Zealand Ben Toma was being sought 
by creditors and police for money he 
owed to all three banks in the Cook 
Islands (among other debts), and for 
his island’s church funds, which “dis-
appeared” while in his care. Toma 
went into hiding in Australia, using a 
diplomatic passport. The New 
Zealand government was so keen to 
get the passport back that it refused to 
renew any Cook Islands diplomatic 
passports until it was returned. The 
public complains about widespread 
incidents like these involving politi-
cians and public servants, and the 
Cook Islands Press editorial of 22 June 
1997 observed that “Money, cement, 
cars, boats, computers, video cameras 
and decks, and many millions in office 
supplies and food have gone missing 
over the years as those in power have helped themselves to overseas aid.” No 
one dares to take ministers to court, 
for the network of power in a small 
community is too pervasive. Not all is 
gloom. The much-respected Minister 
for Justice the Honourable Tiki 
Matapo has often challenged his 
colleagues and public servants over 
conflict of interest and misuse of 
power.
There is little confidence in today’s 
political leaders. A newspaper poll in 
March revealed that an overwhelming 
86 percent of respondents were not 
satisfied with the government. Nor did 
they have faith in the opposition. 
Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Henry 
received only 9 percent support (com-
pared to 17 percent last year). The 
highest approval rating was achieved 
by the Honourable Tiki Matapo, but 
at only 15 percent. Leader of the 
Opposition the Honourable Norman 
George rated only 10 percent (and all 
members of his party together only 19 
percent). George’s 10 percent rating 
seems not to have been changed by his 
public “apology to the nation for my 
past business failures. . . . I’ve hurt 
some people [but] I’ve learned from 
my mistakes.” Given the scale and 
nature of the “mistakes,” however, 
and the number of people hurt, the 
poll suggests that few were moved by 
his request for forgiveness. Sixty 
percent of those polled want a new 
field of politicians, suggesting that a 
credible new party may get public 
support.
In April a new Public Expenditure 
Review Committee was established, 
but the minister of finance (who is also 
prime minister), selects the chairman 
and the cabinet selects the other mem-
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recommendation for an independent 
review committee was rejected. He 
wanted a committee with a much 
wider brief, including hearing com-
plaints about corruption by members 
of parliament and cabinet. The new 
committee is concerned only with 
public servants.
The government decided to delegate 
more financial and administrative 
responsibility to local governments on 
each island. The principle of devolu-
tion is good if there is a local input, 
but how it will work in practice 
remains to be seen, as the govern-
ment will give the Island Councils
the money, and they are highly 
politicized.
Since the government dissipated 
savings (including people’s money in 
the Post Office Savings Bank, the 
superannuation fund, and the reserves 
of public utilities) and minimized 
incentives for people to save, the coun-
try is excessively dependent on foreign 
aid, investment, and initiatives to 
create infrastructure, employment, and 
income. However, the present govern-
ment’s eroded credibility and reputa-
tion for low quality management
have reduced the volume of both aid 
and quality investment. Whereas 
overseas suppliers used to give sixty 
days’ credit, they now give many
Cook Islands businesses thirty days or 
less because of the country’s deteri-
orating image abroad in the past
three years. Many local firms have 
ceased giving credit and deal only in 
cash.
After years of heavy losses, the 
government decided last year to sell its 
four hotels. The Akitua was sold to Tahitian interests. A sale agreement 
was signed for the Rarotongan, with 
the transfer to take place on 26 
November 1996. However, the gov-
ernment revealed that their arrange-
ments to shift the mortgage on it to 
other government assets by the govern-
ment of Nauru (as security for the loan 
to build the Sir Geoffrey Henry Cul-
tural Centre) had not been finalized as 
promised. They therefore advanced 
money to proceed with renovations,
to be repaid once they were able to 
transfer the title. This has been
delayed by five changes of president in 
Nauru. Public criticism of the govern-
ment’s actions was strong. The Vai-
maaga resort lies incomplete, empty, 
and without a definite buyer. The 
Rapae is in the process of being
sold.
The government liquor supplier 
(which had the monopoly on all liquor 
imports) had a history of corruption 
and mismanagement. One former 
manager is still in jail for fraud; some 
ask why he is the only one there. The 
business was sold, and outstanding 
debts of nz$400,000 written off. The 
result of the broken monopoly was a 
reduction in alcohol prices as multiple 
outlets competed for the market. The 
competition has also led to suppliers 
being much more generous in giving
to sporting and other community 
events.
The radio and television service that 
the government sold last year has
been losing money (although only a 
fraction of the losses when it was run 
by the government), but hopes to 
become viable by adding cable tele-
vision. The government dental clinic 
and one outpatient clinic were priva-
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The Rarotonga and Aitutaki air-
ports and shipping ports, power, 
water, and waste management services, 
and the development bank, have been 
advertised for sale, but the policy 
remains contentious and no sales have 
been made. The government has 
offered to return the land to the former 
traditional landowners, who would 
rent it to the investors who buy the 
assets and operate the services.
The Mangaia ostrich farm closed, 
with the loss of one hundred jobs, after 
being for three years the main source 
of private employment on that island. 
A proposed alpaca quarantine station 
(for alpaca en route to Australia) never 
opened, following long and acrimoni-
ous debates. The owners established it 
on neighboring Niue. Copra produc-
tion, which ceased some years ago, 
recommenced on the atolls. It is 
exported to Sâmoa. There is scope for 
more agricultural exports, but Man-
gaians stopped exporting taro in 
September as they had not been paid 
for up to seven months.
A lands commission, set up to ame-
liorate problems of fragmented title, 
absentee ownership, backlogs in the 
land court, and so on, presented its 
report during the year. Action to be 
taken by the government has not yet 
been decided.
A private Internet casino opened. 
Cook Islanders cannot play, and there 
has been criticism of the fact that the 
business was given tax-free status.
The South Pacific Forum holds its 
annual meeting in a different country 
of the region each year. This year the 
Cook Islands’ offer to host the meeting was accepted, but there has been 
public pressure to postpone the invita-
tion for several years until the econ-
omy is in better shape. Hosting the 
Forum in the Sir Geoffrey Henry Cul-
tural Centre will cost nz$500,000 
according to government estimates, 
and $1 million according to some 
others. This is a lot of money for a 
country with a national budget of only 
about nz$50 million, and in financial 
crisis. But the prime minister is deter-
mined to “showcase” the “reform” 
program and rehabilitate his image 
among fellow heads of government. 
Once one of the most positive images, 
it has been badly shattered in recent 
years.
Despite high rates of natural 
increase, the population remained 
static due to emigration, particularly in 
the 15–44 age group. The national 
total of 18,617 in 1991 rose to only 
18,904 by the December 1996 census. 
It rose considerably in the early 1990s, 
but dropped markedly in 1996 and 
early 1997 following the collapse of 
the “bubble economy” that had been 
built on reckless borrowing and non-
maintenance of national assets. The 
proportion of non–Cook Islanders in 
the population has grown, as Cook 
Islanders emigrate and foreigners 
immigrate to set up commercial 
services. Most of these services could 
be set up by Cook Islanders, but the 
government’s dependency-creating 
practices, plus cultural priorities, have 
sapped their initiative and confidence. 
If the hoped-for economic upturn takes 
place there will not be enough staff for 
the hotels and other enterprises and an 
inflow of Filipino and other Asian 
workers is likely—as is apparent 
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The shrinking economy, and the 
higher fees set by the University of the 
South Pacific in Suva, was reflected in 
enrollments of extension students 
being less than one third of what they 
have been. The whole education sys-
tem is currently being reexamined.
The prime minister rode a self-
generated wave of “Cook Islands 
culture,” which the first head of gov-
ernment (his cousin Albert Henry, who 
led the country from 1965 to 1978) 
had likewise used to political advan-
tage. Sir Geoffrey’s goals of enhanced 
cultural integrity were supported, but 
once filtered through his ego and polit-
ical goals, they ended up being 
expressed in such initiatives as bank-
rupting the nation with the Sir 
Geoffrey Henry Cultural Centre. Its 
main hall is empty ninety-nine percent 
of the time and in the one percent of 
time it is used, ninety percent of the 
seats are usually empty. The National 
Library, which is part of the centre, 
was built in an unsuccessful attempt to 
force the closure of the voluntary, 
long-established, and successful Cook 
Islands Library and Museum Society, 
which was chaired by former prime 
minister and political foe Sir Tom 
Davis. The island of ten thousand 
people now has three libraries side by 
side—the third being that of the Uni-
versity of the South Pacific Extension 
Centre. None is adequately staffed or 
equipped. Interest payments on the 
loan for the construction of the Sir 
Geoffrey Henry Cultural Centre are in 
arrears, and the zero-coupon bond, 
donated by the founder of the Cook 
Islands tax haven to repay the capital at the end of the fifteen-year term, was 
cashed early, leaving the government 
with another unmanageable debt.
A Polynesian Song Quest, which 
was to have been an annual event, 
fizzled after the first session, at which 
the government lost considerable 
funds. The rhetorical importance given 
to the Cook Islands language is faced 
with the reality of a deteriorating 
language situation. Nongovernment 
cultural initiatives, on the other hand, 
have in many cases been successful. 
Voluntary expressive arts flourish, 
sponsored mainly by the sources of 
income, travel, and other rewards for 
performance and product—the tourist 
industry, the airlines, and the banks.
The international commercializa-
tion of rugby, league, and soccer began 
in 1996 to provide external funds for 
full-time and part-time Cook Islands 
staff, training in country and abroad, 
equipment, and fares for Cook Islands 
teams to compete in games in several 
different countries each year. The 
Olympic Movement also provides 
funds for in-country and overseas 
training of Cook Islands athletes and 
for equipment and financial support to 
compete abroad. These are valued 
experiences.
Permanent-residence status in the 
Cook Islands is very difficult to obtain, 
and Sir Geoffrey Henry stated publicly 
in 1989 that no more permanent resi-
dence certificates would be issued 
while he was prime minister. The Cook 
Islands constitution states that only the 
High Court can revoke permanent resi-
dence status. That would require very 
good reason, and no such case has ever 
been brought. Nevertheless, the prime 
minister and other ministers from time 
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permanent resident who annoys them. 
Their bugbear during the past couple 
of years has been Jason Brown, pub-
lisher of the Cook Islands Press, whose 
investigative reporting (along with that 
of his equally vigorous Cook Islands 
partner, whom the government cannot 
touch) has hurt the government more 
than any other. It was they who uncov-
ered the Letter of Guarantee scam and 
various others.
In September the government tabled 
a constitutional amendment in parlia-
ment, giving the minister the right to 
deport permanent residents at his 
discretion. The New Zealand govern-
ment did not comment, but several 
New Zealand backbenchers called for 
a review of the automatic right of 
Cook Islanders to enter and remain in 
New Zealand (where there is no 
deportation, even through the courts), 
while New Zealanders have no right to 
enter the Cook Islands. There are two 
and a half times more Cook Islanders 
in New Zealand (over 50,000) than in 
the Cook Islands, but only a few hun-
dred New Zealanders in the Cook 
Islands. Cook Islanders both there and 
at home value the access privilege 
highly, and the possibility of loss of it 
led them to apply pressure on their 
politicians at home. In response, the 
Cook Islands government withdrew 
the proposal for ministerial deporta-
tion and provided for a maximum of 
500 permanent residents at any one 
time. There were then 315. For the 
first time since 1989, a new intake was 
permitted in 1996.
In April the government issued the 
prime minister’s “Vision 2005,” the 
basic goal of which is “to achieve a standard of living better than any in 
the region, and in harmony with our 
culture and environment.” That had 
been achieved by Sir Tom Davis’s 
government in the 1980s, with the 
then exception of Nauru among the 
independent nations and the stark 
exception of the French and American 
territories in which levels of income, 
education, health, and so on are much 
higher. If Sir Geoffrey is to attain his 
goals, it will mean a radical change of 
policy and practice from those he 
applied during his first seven years as 
prime minister. He admitted in the 
Parliamentarian (January 1997), as he 
has publicly at home, “I finally came 
to realize who caused the problem: we 
did—my government and past admin-
istrations.” Nevertheless, the public 
will take some convincing. Henry’s 
commitment to repaying his govern-
ment’s debts will take time to achieve, 
even if expenditure is reduced. The key 
goals in Vision 2005 are to lift eco-
nomic growth through tourism, agri-
culture, marine resource developments, 
offshore financial services, and local 
industries and services. It aims, 
between 1997 and 2005, to get 
government revenue and expenditure 
below 30 percent of gross domestic 
product, net debt (liabilities to current 
assets) down to 30 percent, and to 
build a national reserve of at least 
nz$50 million. The Cook Islands 
remains in a trough, but if the reform 
program is maintained, future 
prospects could be much brighter.
ron crocombe
marjorie tuainekore crocombe
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In the year 1996–97, territorial Presi-
dent Gaston Flosse exerted renewed 
efforts to promote a favorable impres-
sion of the French presence in the 
region. His mission was helped by the 
fact that any fears the French testing 
center might reopen for business are 
dissipating as the site’s facilities are 
being completely dismantled. Regret-
tably, territorial political life is still rife 
with corruption, most notably with
the dismissal of eleven territorial coun-
cillors for electoral fraud. The national 
assembly elections in Tahiti held few 
surprises, with candidates from the 
conservative ruling coalition winning 
both seats. The government’s continu-
ing popularity is in part assured by its 
launching of a splendid range of major 
public works projects subsidized by 
the postnuclear funds from France. 
This review concludes with a brief 
tribute to the life of Francis Sanford.
In the wake of the final series of 
French nuclear tests in the Pacific, 
Gaston Flosse continued his diplo-
matic campaign to redeem France’s 
image among island governments and 
raise the territory’s (and his own) 
profile in regional affairs. To this end, 
at the fifth Pacific leaders’ conference 
held by the Pacific Islands Develop-
ment Program (pidp) in Suva in July, 
Flosse promised us$200,000 on behalf 
of French Polynesia and France to 
ensure the financial viability and 
continuation of the conference. The 
pidp meeting represents one of the few 
opportunities for Flosse to participate 
as an equal among island leaders, 
given that Tahiti is ineligible to be a 
member of the South Pacific Forum. Flosse has thus become a passionate 
advocate of the meeting.
In another move designed to endear 
the territory to regional leaders, Flosse 
bestowed honors on three heads of 
government in mid-1996. The French 
Organic Law of April 1996, granting 
expanded autonomy to the territory, 
conferred the right for Tahiti to freely 
determine its own distinctive symbols. 
The new statutory law allowed the 
creation of a territorial system of 
honors, entitled Order of Tahiti Nui, 
which was passed into legislation by 
the Territorial Assembly in June 1996. 
The first recipients of the new honors 
were Fiji’s Sitiveni Rabuka, Vanuatu’s 
Maxime Carlot Korman, and the Cook 
Islands’ Sir Geoffrey Henry.
After the end of the nuclear test 
series, Flosse took it upon himself to 
announce that a conference would be 
held in Paris in September for Pacific 
leaders to discuss the postnuclear role 
of France in the Pacific. The hasty 
choice of date proved ill advised, as it 
was scheduled only ten days after the 
meeting of the South Pacific Forum, 
which had still to decide whether to 
readmit France into the Post-Forum 
Dialogue after its suspension the previ-
ous year because of the final test series. 
As a result of this poor timing, in July 
Flosse announced that the Pacific 
leaders’ meeting in Paris would be 
deferred until an undetermined date in 
1997.
At the Forum meeting itself, held in 
Majuro on 2 September, a Tahitian 
delegation caused a minor diplomatic 
incident when a territorial minister and 
an adviser to President Flosse arrived 
uninvited to press the case for France’s 
readmission to the Post-Forum 
political reviews • polynesia 199Dialogue. Although the Tahitians were 
politely excluded from the Forum’s 
deliberations, ultimately on 3 Septem-
ber the leaders did decide to readmit 
France, effective immediately. As a 
result, at the Dialogue meeting held a 
few days later France was represented 
by the French minister for European 
Affairs, Michel Barnier,
and Gaston Flosse.
While progress is being made in 
Tahiti’s relations with its Pacific neigh-
bors, the same cannot be said for its 
attitude to the European Union (eu) 
with which it is associated as an over-
seas territory. In early February, Flosse 
launched into a passionate diatribe 
against the European Union. “Be 
European, yes. But not at any price!” 
He invoked the dangers of an invasion 
of European immigrants to the terri-
tory in view of new directives that, if 
applied, would allow eu citizens easy 
access to set up residence and seek 
employment in the territory. He also 
accused Europe of giving the overseas 
territories only 10 percent of the finan-
cial aid granted per capita to overseas 
departments.
On 20 February, Flosse moved and 
passed a resolution in the Territorial 
Assembly that “the obligations 
imposed [by Europe] on FP largely 
outweigh the advantages that she gets 
. . . she demands immediately that the 
power granted by her statute be recog-
nised and protected from all incursions 
by European law. [The Territorial 
Assembly was] convinced that the free 
installation of Europeans would pose a 
grave risk of social disequilibrium. . . .” 
Flosse further warned that “if at the 
outset of negotiations we do not get 
satisfaction, I think we will be driven to sever all links with the EU” (Tahiti 
Pacifique, March 1997, pp 8, 53).
An earlier vote by the French Senate 
in July had provoked concern along 
similar lines. The Senate voted in favor 
of a bill that abolished the requirement 
of a return airfare for metropolitan 
French traveling to overseas French 
possessions. This move revived fears in 
Tahiti that there would be an uncon-
trolled influx of people seeking work 
and residence in a territory that is 
already struggling to combat high 
unemployment.
The dismantling of facilities at the 
Moruroa test site has been progressing 
slowly. Virtually everything will be 
destroyed, except for five blockhouses 
used to monitor the atmospheric tests, 
the airport runway, and port facilities. 
French Atomic Energy Commission 
authorities predict it will take two 
years to complete the process. This 
time frame will allow for the gradual 
voluntary separation of some four 
hundred employees of the test center. 
President Flosse confirmed that France 
would maintain a permanent labora-
tory for radiological surveillance and 
several technicians to run it. Flosse 
also reported that Moruroa is unsuit-
able for any commercial enterprises, 
such as tourism, because of the high 
costs of transporting goods and 
services to the isolated atoll.
The remaining medium- and low-
level nuclear waste at the test sites has 
been interred in deep shafts and cov-
ered with concrete. According to a 
French military spokesman, General 
Michel Boileau, the atoll will be 
returned to its “original state” follow-
ing a program of revegetation. Boileau 
insists that no radioactivity remains on 
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Fangataufa. The extent of any surface 
radioactivity and the likelihood of 
future leakage from radioactive 
substances underground should be 
clarified in a forthcoming report by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 
due to be released early in 1998.
As part of France’s new policy of 
transparency, in October a press dele-
gation, and later a delegation from the 
French parliament, were invited to 
inspect the dismantling of facilities and 
cleaning up at the atolls. The parlia-
mentary delegation represented the 
three major parties and included a 
specialist on nuclear wastes, Mr 
Bataille. He sought guarantees that 
France would fulfill its responsibilities 
and ensure that monitoring of the test 
sites continued not just for ten years, 
but for several generations. The dele-
gation also noted that the French 
parliament has a right to call for inde-
pendent verification of radioactive 
monitoring at Moruroa in addition to 
that undertaken by the French Atomic 
Energy Commission and the military, 
though whether it will exercise this 
right is unclear. (For more on nuclear 
issues, see the Region in Review, 1996 
[Contemporary Pacific 9:448–457; 
1997].)
Territorial political life was as color-
ful as ever in respect to corruption alle-
gations and continuing court cases. 
During the year, a number of mayors 
were convicted for corruption and 
forced to pay fines and give up their 
public offices. In November, a corrup-
tion case implicating Flosse and the 
former Pape‘ete mayor-cum-national 
deputy, Jean Juventin, was sent to the 
Correctional Tribunal in Paris by the Court of Appeal. Flosse will be judged 
for passive corruption and complicity 
relating to clandestine casinos in his 
municipality of Pirae in 1991 and 
1992. Juventin must face similar 
charges concerning casinos in Pape‘ete 
in 1988. The casinos were managed by 
Julien Li Lem, alias Hombo, who is 
facing charges of active corruption and 
running illegal casinos. Hombo has 
publicly declared that Flosse and 
Juventin accepted bribes for their per-
sonal gain and for their respective 
political parties in return for turning a 
blind eye to the casinos’ operations. As 
in the past, concluding these court 
cases has proved painfully slow.
In a shock move on 25 March, the 
state-run Administrative Tribunal 
annulled the election of eleven territo-
rial councillors from the last election 
held in May 1996. Their alleged elec-
toral fraud involved the misuse of 
funds designated to assist the outer 
islands to facilitate the election of 
members of the government majority, 
that is, the Tahoeraa party of Flosse. 
The commission deciding distribution 
of these funds, presided over by a 
Tahoeraa member, had provided hous-
ing benefits to inhabitants of the Lee-
ward Islands just prior to the 1996 
territorial elections to influence voting 
preferences. Flosse was named in 
connection with dubious practices in 
the Marquesas, where he gave his 
approval for the construction of a 
football field and provided materials 
and labor for the project from the 
territorial public works service. These 
incidents led to the dismissal of eleven 
Tahoeraa councillors, three from the 
Marquesas and eight from the Lee-
ward Islands.
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toral fraud comes after many years of 
allegations that public funds, services, 
and jobs have been routinely used to 
influence voters, particularly in favor 
of parties incumbent in government. 
The standing down of more than a 
third of the governing majority is 
unprecedented. Moreover, by-elec-
tions for eleven members of the forty-
one-seat assembly could tip the bal-
ance of power if voters turn against 
Tahoeraa due to its implication in 
fraud. In view of the dire consequences 
the government faces as a result of by-
elections, on 1 April Flosse launched 
an appeal to the Council of State in 
France to overturn the Administrative 
Tribunal’s decision. At the time of 
writing the outcome of this appeal was 
not known. New elections are sched-
uled for these electoral districts in late 
1997, though the pro-independence 
leader, Oscar Temaru, has called for 
new elections to be held throughout 
the territory.
In a separate development, for the 
first time the courts judged that the 
French Overseas Radio and Television 
network, rfo, had exhibited bias in its 
allocation of air time to different polit-
ical parties prior to the territorial elec-
tion. The court condemned the fact 
that in the first four months of 1996, 
rfo had provided five times as much 
coverage to the governing Tahoeraa 
party as it had to opposition parties, 
including the pro-independence party 
of Oscar Temaru. Subsequently, in 
April, rfo came under fire again for its 
partial treatment of politics. Flosse had 
accused Temaru on rfo tv of having 
been responsible for the riots that led 
to the destruction of the airport in September 1995. When Temaru sought 
the right of reply on rfo, his request 
was refused.
In another blow to the Tahoeraa 
majority, its parent party and metro-
politan ally, the Rassemblement Pour 
la Republique, was toppled from 
power in May. The governing conser-
vative coalition in France made a tacti-
cal error in deciding to hold early 
elections for a new National Assembly. 
A backlash over unemployment, immi-
gration policy, and relations with the 
European Union saw the conservatives 
ousted, and a coalition dominated by 
the socialists came to power. It remains 
to be seen whether the territorial 
government will have stormy relations 
with the socialists as it has done in the 
past, although President Chirac can be 
expected to continue protecting the 
interests of his protégé and friend, 
Gaston Flosse.
The national election results were 
somewhat different for the two candi-
dates chosen to represent French 
Polynesia. As the poll was held a week 
earlier there than in metropolitan 
France, voters were unaffected by the 
tide of discontent that turned against 
Jacques Chirac’s Rassemblement Pour 
la Republique. Instead, conservative 
candidates from the territory’s govern-
ing coalition won majorities in the first 
round without having to contest a 
second run-off. In the eastern elector-
ate, Emile Vernaudon, the mayor of 
Mahina and leader of the Ai‘a Api 
party, which is allied to Tahoeraa, won 
comfortably with 58.9 percent of the 
votes cast. In the western district, 
Michel Buillard, a Tahoeraa minister 
and mayor of Pape‘ete, won with a 
narrower margin of 51.5 percent. 
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for his money by Oscar Temaru, the 
pro-independence leader and mayor of 
Faaa, who gained a strong vote of 41.6 
percent.
Overall, the pro-independence party 
Tavini made solid gains throughout 
most of the archipelagoes, especially in 
the Windward Islands, but Tahoeraa 
kept its grip on the Marquesas. As 
always though, it is difficult to draw 
firm conclusions from trends in 
national elections held in Tahiti. 
Knowing that the outcome will not 
have a direct impact on local politics, 
voters can use these elections as a pro-
test vote against the incumbent govern-
ment without necessarily supporting 
independence or transferring their 
votes to opposition parties when it 
comes to territorial and municipal elec-
tions. The real extent of support for 
Tavini and other opposition parties 
will be demonstrated in the forthcom-
ing territorial by-elections.
The problem of disposing of Tahiti’s 
waste remained unresolved and was a 
source of contention throughout the 
year. In mid-1996, for the third time in 
as many years, the date for the closure 
of the over-full Faaa municipal dump 
came and went in the absence of alter-
native rubbish sites being developed. 
Sitom, the public company charged 
with resolving the waste issue, proved 
incapable of fulfilling its mission. In 
February, the government established a 
new semipublic company to deal with 
the urban waste problem, the Polyne-
sian Environment Society, in which the 
territory would retain a majority share.
A site in the valley of Papenoo was 
identified to host the new waste dis-
posal facility. The choice of location has provoked considerable opposition 
from local residents, mayors, and envi-
ronmentalists. Apart from a not-in-
my-backyard attitude, reasons for this 
opposition include that Papenoo is 
subject to the highest rainfall level in 
Tahiti, the site is close to a river 
system, and the long road servicing the 
site would need to undergo constant 
repairs to accommodate the heavy 
traffic of garbage trucks.
In the year under review, the territo-
rial government decided on several 
major public works projects and other 
socioeconomic initiatives, to be largely 
financed by the special postnuclear era 
funds granted by President Chirac. 
These projects are meant to improve 
infrastructure and social services, 
create jobs, and generally boost the 
ailing economy. On the health front, 
there will be a new hospital to replace 
the one in Mamao, a new psychiatric 
hospital to replace the old institution 
in Vaiami, and a cardiology clinic. 
With regard to public housing, the 
government made a commitment to 
building seven thousand new lodgings 
over the coming decade. A new build-
ing to house the Territorial Assembly’s 
administration will be constructed at a 
cost of 1.2 billion fcfp, and the presi-
dential office will move to a historic 
building, Caserne Broche, to be refur-
bished at a cost of 600 million fcfp.
In September, President Flosse 
revealed an ambitious plan to build a 
tunnel under the lagoon to connect the 
Faaa airport with Pape‘ete’s seaport. 
This was proposed to alleviate the 
chronic traffic congestion in the capi-
tal. The tunnel is estimated to cost 12 
billion fcfp. The idea is for the tunnel 
to be constructed privately and eventu-
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fcfp each time a vehicle uses it. It is 
hoped that by a year after its opening, 
25,000 cars will travel via the tunnel 
each day. However, considerable 
doubts have been aired in the public 
domain about whether it is feasible for 
an island that accounts for only 
40,000 vehicles to recoup the costs of 
the tunnel.
On 31 October, Flosse launched 
another grand project, this time to 
establish the territory’s own interna-
tional airline. The decision to proceed 
was based on three years of feasibility 
studies. Initially called Tahiti Airline, it 
later underwent a name change to Air 
Tahiti-Nui with a view to removing the 
anglophone connotations. The first 
plane to be acquired will be an Airbus 
340–300 with a passenger-carrying 
capacity of 380. The first airbus will 
be delivered in April 1998. It will 
mainly service routes connecting Tahiti 
with the United States, Japan, and 
Korea.
The Territorial Assembly has voted 
to contribute 10 percent of the initial 
capital for the airline to encourage 
private investors to take the plunge. It 
is expected that the airline will post a 
loss of 250 million fcfp in its first year 
of operation, but that it will produce 
profits of 300 million and 1 billion 
fcfp in the subsequent two years. If all 
goes according to plan, another plane 
will be acquired. The government is 
confident that Air Tahiti-Nui will 
promote tourism and generally fare 
better than many of the unprofitable 
airlines run by neighboring Pacific 
microstates.
Yet another project, supported by 
the territory even though it is not directly involved in the execution, is 
the forthcoming debut of a new luxury 
cruise ship. The Paul Gauguin luxury 
liner of 16,000 tonnes will carry 320 
passengers and is destined to cruise 
mainly around the Society Islands. It is 
presently under construction, with 
plans for a launching in January 1998. 
Though Tahiti will benefit from the 
visiting tourists, the liner will be regis-
tered in Wallis and Futuna and man-
aged by an American company. An 
additional project to stimulate tourism 
is the planned construction of a new 
hotel of 252 rooms in Arue. This hotel 
will be targeted at an older clientele, 
principally retired metropolitan French 
civil servants.
In September, the government 
implemented legislation to create a 
youth employment initiative. The new 
measure is directed toward low-skilled, 
unemployed young people of 17 to 26 
years of age, with a view to subsidizing 
their employment in the private sector 
for up to eight months and providing 
them with supplementary training. 
This policy was in part prompted by 
the large involvment of unemployed 
youth in the September 1995 riots. 
Concern over unemployment was 
shown to be warranted once official 
figures were released by the Territo-
rial Institute of Statistics (itstat) in 
October.
The latest statistics on employment 
were collected in 1994. At that time 
there were ostensibly 9,320 unem-
ployed out of an active population of 
79,120 people, which translates into 
an official unemployment rate of 11.8 
percent. However, the real rate has 
been estimated to be in the vicinity of 
16,000 unemployed. The public and 
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26,864 jobs respectively, with an addi-
tional 5,000 in the liberal professions, 
leaving the remaining 30,000 workers 
(or 44 percent) in the traditional sector 
of subsistence agriculture and fisheries. 
Ninety per cent of people of working 
age are resident in the Society Islands, 
which confirms the inexorable exodus 
of people from the outlying islands to 
the urban areas.
In December, provisional results 
from itstat’s census of the territory’s 
population in September were 
released. A total of 219,521 inhab-
itants were divided among the archi-
pelagoes as follows: Windward Islands 
(including Tahiti) 162,686; Leeward 
Islands 26,838; Marquesas 8,064; 
Tuamotu-Gambiers 15,370; Australs 
6,811. The island of Tahiti, where the 
capital, Pape‘ete, is situated, accounts 
for 68.6 percent of the territory’s 
population. In French Polynesia, 
94,651 of the inhabitants (or 43 
percent) are less than twenty years of 
age. Population growth since the last 
census eight years earlier has been at a 
rate of 16.3 percent, or 1.9 percent per 
year. This represents a decrease com-
pared to the previous census period of 
1983–1988, which registered a growth 
of 2.6 percent per year.
Fiscal reform to reduce the territo-
rial government’s dependence on 
import duties, which account for 70 
percent of collected revenue, has been 
a long-standing source of contention in 
territorial politics and also in the terri-
tory’s relations with the French state. 
The territory has to date had no form 
of income tax. After years of to-ing 
and fro-ing over constitutional issues, 
the French National Assembly finally approved territorial legislation for a 
modest Contribution to Territorial 
Solidarity tax in March that is meant 
to cover increased public health costs.
In February the Territorial Assem-
bly also adopted legislation to imple-
ment a value added tax to take effect 
in January 1998. A report by itstat 
(Jan 1997), assessing the pros and cons 
of such a goods and services tax, noted 
several potentially negative outcomes. 
First, the tax would not be egalitarian 
because it was likely to have a greater 
impact on poorer households. Second, 
it is likely to provoke inflation, which 
would in turn deter investment and 
tourism. Inflationary pressures could 
also be brought to bear on salaries, 
especially those of the public service, 
which are indexed to the cost of living. 
The end result could thus be a redistri-
bution of wealth in the territory from 
the private sector to the public sector.
Several categories of goods and 
services will be exempt from the value 
added tax, including medical services, 
education, cultural activities, financial 
services, water, and goods sold by 
farmers and fishermen. Key categories 
to be subject to the tax include the sale 
of new products, port and airport 
services, telecommunications and 
computers, energy distribution, and 
transport. The standard rate of tax will 
be 3 percent, while some goods and 
services, including food, nonalcoholic 
beverages, publications, hotel services, 
and interisland transport, will be sub-
ject to a lower tax of 1–2 percent. The 
government’s plan is not to add to the 
total tax burden, but to substitute the 
value added tax for existing duties on 
imports, which will be phased out over 
five years. However, given that the 
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on new products imported from 
abroad, it is unlikely to make a huge 
difference to the current reliance on 
import duties.
With sadness I report the passing of 
Francis Ariioehau Sanford, who died 
at his home in Faaa on 21 December at 
84 years of age. I had the good fortune 
to interview this key player in Tahitian 
politics during my last visit to the terri-
tory. His career spanned a diverse 
range of roles in the public service and 
politics. He worked first as an admin-
istrator in the Tuamotus, and later in 
Bora Bora throughout the Second 
World War. After a period of teaching, 
he became secretary to the French gov-
ernor in 1963. His foray into politics 
began with his election as the first 
mayor of Faaa in 1965, a position he 
held until 1983. He was elected to the 
National Assembly in 1967 and held 
this office until 1978. Sanford was the 
driving force behind the Ai‘a Api party, 
which he cofounded in 1965. He led 
the territorial government in coalition 
with the Here Ai‘a party from 1967 to 
1972, and again from 1977 to 1982. 
He fell from power after his party was 
decimated in the 1983 elections.
From 1967 onward, Sanford 
became known for his relentless oppo-
sition to the French nuclear testing 
program, a campaign he took to the 
French National Assembly and even to 
the United Nations. His strategy of 
collaborating with the French and 
global antitesting movement certainly 
hastened France’s decision to cease 
atmospheric testing in 1975. He also 
fought long and hard for an expansion 
of the territory’s autonomy in relation 
to France. Sanford’s linkage of the two goals of ending the tests and expand-
ing autonomy meant that for many 
years the French state would not budge 
on either. At one point he became so 
frustrated in his quest that he threat-
ened to push for independence, but 
eventually settled for a limited statute 
of autonomy in 1977. Sanford retired 
from politics in 1985, yet, as a 
respected elder statesman, he remained 
in great demand as an adviser to the 
new generation of politicians.
karin von strokirch
Hawaiian Issues
A heated debate erupted in Honolulu 
in the summer of 1996 regarding the 
State of Hawai‘i–sponsored plebiscite 
on the question of Hawaiian sover-
eignty. The plebiscite was the state’s 
response to the “taro roots” march of 
seventeen thousand Hawaiians on 
‘Iolani Palace (former governmental 
seat of the Hawaiian Kingdom) in 
January 1993 demanding sovereignty, 
or political control over Hawaiian 
Trust Lands, and denouncing the 
hundred-year-old illegal American 
presence in Hawai‘i.
In November of the same year, the 
United States Congress serendipi-
tously passed what has become known 
as the Apology Bill (US Public Law 
103–150) that gave additional
support to the return of lands to 
Hawaiians. The 1993 Apology Bill, 
signed by President Clinton, admitted 
that in 1893 America illegally invaded 
Hawai‘i and illegally overthrew the 
democratically elected Hawaiian 
government. The Apology Bill further 
stated that “the indigenous Hawaiian 
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claims to their inherent sovereignty as 
a people over their national lands to 
the United States, either through their 
monarchy or through a plebiscite or 
referendum.” The bill ended with a 
vague call for a process of reconcilia-
tion. Hawaiians responded with a 
proposal for Hawaiian control over 
Hawaiian Trust Lands as the central 
part of any reconciliation.
At stake is the control of two 
million acres of Hawaiian Trust Lands, 
so designated by American law, and 
presently controlled by the State of 
Hawai‘i. Hawaiian Trust Lands are 
demarcated by two trusts: 200,000 
acres of Hawaiian Home Lands, estab-
lished in 1921 to provide homesteads 
for Hawaiians, and 1.8 million acres of 
Ceded Lands Trust, set up in the 1959 
Statehood Admissions Act, to benefit 
social conditions of Hawaiians.
Since 1959, Hawaiians have been 
legally defined as wards of the State of 
Hawai‘i, along with children and men-
tally incompetent adults. As a result of 
wardship, the state has a legal right to 
control Hawaiian Trust Lands, which 
make up 90 percent of the lands held 
by the state. Clearly, the State of 
Hawai‘i has a conflict of interest with 
regard to Hawaiian Trust Lands.
The State of Hawai‘i uses Hawaiian 
Trust Lands for airports, harbors, uni-
versities, elementary schools, hospitals, 
and public housing projects, as well as 
leasing large tracts to non-Hawaiian 
settlers for sugar and pineapple plan-
tations and for industrial uses. Hawai-
ians receive not a penny of revenue 
from these lands, although 20 percent 
is given to another state agency, the 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs (oha). Oha has decided it is better to invest 
the money in various portfolios rather 
than dispense it to Hawaiians in need.
However, until the “inherent sover-
eignty” issue, raised by the Apology 
Bill, is resolved, there continues to be a 
cloud on title to a portion of the trust 
lands, making it impossible for the 
state to sell such lands. To resolve the 
situation, the State of Hawai‘i orga-
nized a plebiscite vote. The state-spon-
sored plebiscite, which was held from 
1 July to 15 August 1996 by means of 
a mail-in ballot, was the sort of ple-
biscite mentioned in the Apology Bill, 
intended to compromise Hawaiian 
sovereign rights to land and resources. 
It would be that “plebiscite” by which 
Hawaiians would relinquish “their 
claims to their inherent sovereignty as 
a people over their national lands to 
the United States.” The plebiscite 
would thus undermine the Hawaiian 
sovereignty movement’s legal 
challenges for control of Hawaiian 
Trust Lands.
The 1996 plebiscite asked the ques-
tion, “Shall the Hawaiian people elect 
delegates to propose a Native Hawai-
ian government?” Since the Hawaiian 
sovereignty group Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i 
had written a constitution in 1987, 
held democratic elections, seated a 
government-in-exile, and presented 
interventions at the United Nations, 
citizens of Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i saw the 
state-sponsored constitutional conven-
tion as an obvious attempt to co-opt 
Hawaiian self-determination.
Moreover, in the state legislature’s 
bill that established the plebiscite, 
specific language cautioned that 
“Nothing arising out of the Hawaiian 
convention provide[d] for in this Act 
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conflict, waive, alter, or affect” the 
government structures and land 
management of the state. Hawaiians 
asked why they should vote at all if 
there was no land to be gained from 
such a vote.
Under international law, whether 
Hawaiians voted yes, or whether they 
voted no, so long as they voted in the 
state-sponsored plebiscite, their vote 
would mean that they had accepted the 
State of Hawai‘i’s jurisdiction over 
such an election, and by extension, 
that Hawaiians condoned the status of 
state wardship. Under international 
law, the United Nations should oversee 
such a plebiscite, but only after Native 
Hawaiians had been availed of the 
right to consider and choose among 
many different forms of government as 
their favored option.
In actuality, the state-sponsored 
plebiscite was a demonstration elec-
tion, akin to those sponsored by 
France in Kanaky and in French-
occupied Polynesia, or American-
backed regimes in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. Demonstration elections 
have been held by colonial govern-
ments to give the appearance of native 
agreement to a colonialist-controlled 
political process.
In opposition to the state-sponsored 
plebiscite, Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i was 
joined by a coalition of Hawaiian 
groups, including the Ahupua‘a Action 
Alliance, the Hawai‘i Coalition 
Against Nuclear Testing, the Hawai‘i 
Ecumenical Council, the Kanaka 
Maoli Tribunal Komike, Ka Pâkaukau, 
Kûikalâhiki, Nâ Mamo o Hawai‘i, 
Noa, Nuclear Free and Independent 
Pacific, Pacific Women’s Network, and the Pro-Hawaiian Sovereignty Work-
ing Group. The coalition was opposed 
to the plebiscite because they saw it as 
a state attempt to deny self-determina-
tion to Hawaiians and to undermine 
gains made in the Apology Bill.
The plebiscite debate was further 
embittered by the governor of the State 
of Hawai‘i who appointed a nineteen-
member commission of Hawaiians to 
conduct the mechanics of the vote and 
supposedly oversee the subsequent 
“Hawaiian” constitutional conven-
tion. State officials insisted that 
Hawaiians were too divided among 
themselves to proceed on the question 
of Hawaiian sovereignty without the 
aid and direction of the legislature, or 
a council beholden to the state legisla-
ture. The commission was named
the Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections 
Council (hsec) and was given $2.2 
million to pay for the plebiscite and 
conduct an advertising campaign to 
induce the public to vote. These 
Hawaiians, often referred to as “Vichy 
Hawaiians,” recalling the French who 
collaborated with German invaders 
during World War II, were not elected 
by any Hawaiian body and thus were 
not representatives of the Hawaiian 
people. Many were affiliated with vari-
ous state agencies; many were also 
related by blood to those who vehe-
mently opposed the plebiscite.
The anti-plebiscite campaign was 
conducted by Hawaiians who had very 
little money; perhaps five thousand 
dollars was spent in total. Most efforts 
were made without funding, except 
what people took from their own 
pockets. Their rallying cry was for all 
Hawaiians to “Boycott the Ballot,” 
and their campaign included door-to-
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protests, press conferences, community 
workshops, and free spots on public 
television channels.
From January to May 1996, a team 
from Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i lobbied and 
presented testimony at the state legisla-
ture against the plebiscite bill. They 
managed to kill the bill in April, only 
to have it resurrected in May as an 
attachment to another unrelated bill. 
Fearing the results of a grassroots 
campaign, at the last minute the 
Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Coun-
cil changed the name of the plebiscite 
to “Native Hawaiian vote” and revised 
how ballots would be counted. In the 
original bill, the plebiscite’s determina-
tion would be made by a “majority of 
qualified voters,” but in the final 
wording it became a “majority of 
ballots cast”; technically six out of ten 
votes could decide the outcome.
The opposition coalition then held a 
one-week vigil with daily demonstra-
tions in front of the governor’s man-
sion, urging him to veto the bill. 
Overwhelming public support, by way 
of cars honking in rush-hour traffic, 
carried a direct message to the gover-
nor. However, on 19 June 1996, the 
last day possible and only two weeks 
before the mail-out of ballots was to 
begin, Governor Cayetano signed the 
bill.
On 1 July 1996, as ballots were 
being mailed out, a delegation from 
the Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization (unpo) arrived 
in Hawai‘i “to look at the current 
political, social and economic status of 
the Kanaka Maoli in Hawai‘i; to 
understand the possible effects of the 
US Public Law 103–150 (the Apology Bill); and to learn about the events 
leading up to and the implementation 
and the possible impact of the State of 
Hawai‘i’s initiative to hold a Native 
Hawaiian ‘Plebiscite’ or ‘Vote’.” They 
had been invited by Mililani Trask, the 
kia‘âina (governor) of Ka Lâhui 
Hawai‘i.
The unpo delegation was headed by 
Mr Lodi Gyari, from Tibet, who is 
chairman of the Peace Action Council. 
Other members were Dr Michael van 
Walt, general secretary of unpo, Mr 
Menelaos Tzelios, representative of the 
Greek Minority in Albania and assis-
tant general secretary for United 
Nations Affairs, and Mr Robin Sluyk, 
head of the Pacific and North America 
Desk of the unpo Secretariat.
After hearing several days of testi-
mony by the community, as well as 
interviews with the Hawaiian Sover-
eignty Elections Council, the unpo 
delegation concluded that the plebi-
scite or “vote, as it is currently being 
conducted, does not satisfy interna-
tional standards for a ‘free and 
informed choice,’ which are also 
adhered to by the United States” 
(unpo Preliminary Report).
As a result the unpo mission urged 
“the Government of the State of 
Hawai‘i and the hsec (Hawaiian 
Sovereignty Elections Council) to 
cancel the vote, even at this late stage. 
The delegation believes that before the 
people are presented with an opportu-
nity to vote on a process leading to 
sovereignty, Native Hawaiian organi-
zations should be encouraged and 
independently funded to conduct edu-
cation programs on all options for 
sovereignty. They should also be 
afforded the opportunity to develop 
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ians on a process to exercise their right 
to self-determination.”
On 15 July 1996, Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i 
sent their delegation (Keali‘i Gora and 
Kealoha Pisciotti) to Geneva, Switzer-
land, to the United Nations Working 
Group on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, and subsequently the Sub-
Commission on Human Rights. Gora 
and Pisciotti presented interventions 
protesting the state-sponsored plebi-
scite, and distributed copies of the US 
Apology Bill. Dozens of countries’ 
representatives flocked to their table to 
get copies of their interventions and US 
Public Law 103–150.
The Pro-Hawaiian Sovereignty 
Working Group also sent a delegation 
consisting of Jose Morin and Nalani 
Minton. Both delegations met with 
American government representatives 
to formally protest the state-sponsored 
plebiscite, and every important 
nation’s representative was informed 
of the situation.
At the same time, back in Hawai‘i, 
the Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections 
Council was running an expensive tele-
vision and radio campaign in Hawai-
ian and English, urging Hawaiians to 
vote in the plebiscite, or what they 
renamed the “Native Hawaiian Vote.” 
The hsec video used oha interview 
clips with respected Hawaiian elders 
on the topic of sovereignty, but not on 
the topic of the plebiscite, to promote 
their cause. When elders who opposed 
the plebiscite discovered that they were 
being used in this manner, many 
actively joined the anti-plebiscite cam-
paign and directed their families to 
“Boycott the Ballot.”
The opposition coalition also hit the airwaves, giving guest interviews on 
radio talk shows and on free public 
television venues like O‘ahu Speaks. 
Haunani-Kay Trask (sister of Mililani 
Trask) used her monthly political 
analysis television show First Friday, 
with a viewing audience of fifty thou-
sand, to interview international law 
experts like Jose Morin. Morin 
explained how plebiscites were used in 
Puerto Rico and other places by colo-
nizers to undermine native self-deter-
mination.
The hsec video used the Hawaiian 
phrase nau no e koho, meaning “the 
choice is yours.” Since koho also 
means to vote, Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i citi-
zens used the slogan Koho Hewa, or 
“illegal vote,” as hewa carries a double 
meaning of bad luck or disaster. Citi-
zens got a grant of $1,000 to make a 
video explaining the State of Hawai‘i’s 
conflict of interest and urging Hawai-
ians to “Boycott the Vote.” The Koho 
Hewa video was shown extensively on 
public television on O‘ahu, and it was 
sent to Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i outposts on 
the neighbor islands to be aired on 
their own public television stations. 
The tape was also sent to Ka Lâhui 
Hawai‘i outposts on the North Ameri-
can continent, including Anchorage, 
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, San Diego, Salt Lake City, 
and Las Vegas.
Ballots were due to be returned by 
mail on 15 August 1996. Before they 
could be unsealed and announced, 
Clara Kakalia, a Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i 
kupuna (elder) and her cohorts, filed a 
suit against the state-sponsored 
plebiscite as a misuse of state funds. 
Ultimately, Judge David Ezra ruled 
against them, declaring that the State 
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opinion poll, but announcement of the 
vote results was delayed until mid-
September.
About 82,000 ballots were mailed 
to Hawaiians in the state and wherever 
known throughout the world; of these 
only 30,423 ballots were returned, 
proving that the boycott campaign was 
overwhelmingly successful. A vast 
majority of Hawaiians, 52,000, boy-
cotted the state-sponsored plebiscite. 
Of the 30,432 ballots returned, 8,129 
voted no in response to the question, 
and many said they voted no because 
they didn’t want the State of Hawai‘i 
to control the process.
Meanwhile hsec members, assisted 
by the local anti-Hawaiian news-
papers, insisted that the 22,294 
Hawaiians who voted yes represented 
72 percent of Hawaiians, or at least of 
the “majority of ballots cast,” as called 
for in the last version of the plebiscite 
bill. They thereby declared a mandate 
to continue with a state-sponsored 
Hawaiian Constitutional Convention 
that would form a “Hawaiian Nation” 
under state auspices. As the state was 
experiencing a severe economic reces-
sion and could provide only a portion 
of the funds required, the Hawaiian 
Sovereignty Elections Council formed 
a nonprofit corporation called Ha 
Hawai‘i (Hawaiian Breath) to receive 
funds from private sources.
Since many state legislators were 
unimpressed with the results of the 
plebiscite, the Hawaiian Sovereignty 
Elections Council decided to call for a 
Hawaiian convention to be held in 
Honolulu on 14 December 1996 to 
gain additional public support for their 
convention proposal and the nonprofit status of Ha Hawai‘i. The Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs offered to pay for 
Hawaiians on the outer islands to fly 
in to the meeting, especially if they 
represented a larger group. Ka Lâhui 
Hawai‘i directed its neighbor island 
people to apply for the ticket as repre-
sentatives of their own ‘ohana, or 
family.
On 14 December 1996, hundreds 
Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i representatives and 
their coalition allies flooded the hsec 
convention. Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i 
Kia‘âina Mililani Trask had been 
denied permission to speak, and partic-
ipants were warned that unruly behav-
ior would be met with eviction from 
the hall. However, chanters represent-
ing Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i were allowed to 
make a ho‘okupu (ceremonial presen-
tation) to the house, whereupon all of 
their supporters stood at their seats 
chanting en masse in Hawaiian as their 
representatives delivered copies of the 
Ka Lâhui constitution to the Hawaiian 
Sovereignty Elections Council.
As each hsec member rose to speak 
in favor of a state-funded Hawaiian 
Constitutional Convention, the oppo-
sition silently flipped up bright char-
treuse placards that read “ ‘a‘ole! no! 
ha hawai‘i = state control.” Not 
only did this become increasingly 
disconcerting to hsec speakers, but the 
brightly colored placards made clear 
that the audience was quite divided on 
the issue and no consensus would be 
reached that day.
Finally, Mililani Trask was allowed 
to speak, and she pledged Ka Lâhui 
Hawai‘i to seek unity and self-deter-
mination among all Hawaiians, out-
side the state process, in order to 
strengthen the struggle for control of 
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behind-the-scenes lobbying during the 
lunch break, former oha trustee and 
hsec member Kina‘u Kamali‘i 
acknowledged that consensus could 
not be obtained, and instead brokered 
a deal between various factions to hold 
a unity conference in February at the 
sacred land of Kualoa, O‘ahu.
What caused bitter enemies to agree 
to a unity conference? The deciding 
factor was movement on another front 
of federal legislation in Washington, 
dc, that would redefine Hawaiians as 
an Indian Tribe, and make Hawaiians 
subject to the restrictive laws that 
govern Native American Indians.
Under a frequently discussed plan, 
America would recognize a puppet 
state agency, the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs, as the new Hawaiian govern-
ment, as it has done in similar in-
stances with Native Americans. It is 
likely the American government will 
further diminish the Hawaiian land 
base to two hundred thousand acres of 
third and fourth class lands (one part 
of the Hawaiian Land Trust known as 
Hawaiian Home Lands), and create a 
new oha nation.
The other 1.8 million acres of well-
watered land would be reclassified and 
given to the State of Hawai‘i. As is 
consistent with American policy on 
Natives, only those 7,000 Hawaiians 
currently living on Hawaiian Home 
Lands would be recognized as the citi-
zens of the new nation, thus disenfran-
chising the other 200,000 Hawaiians 
who want access to land. The time had 
come for Hawaiian political leaders to 
unify against the common threat of 
loss of lands.
The first Ho‘omalu ma Kualoa (Peace and Sanctity at Kualoa) Unity 
Conference was held on the camp-
ground of Kualoa for the three days of 
7, 8, and 9 February 1997. Ho‘omalu 
was attended by many Hawaiians from 
all walks of life, some members of 
larger groups, some individuals, and 
many small family representatives. All 
agreed to seek agreement where it was 
possible, and to delay debate on areas 
of disagreement for another time.
Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i citizens and many 
members of the coalition attended, as 
did the usually conservative groups 
like the Association of Hawaiian Civic 
Clubs and the State Hawaiian Home-
steaders Association. Bumpy Kana-
hele’s Nation of Hawai‘i came, as did 
some hsec appointees. Those calling 
for complete independence from 
America, such as Ka Pâkaukau, and 
Kaona came. It was perhaps the first 
time that many middle-class Hawai-
ians listened to what “taro roots” 
Hawaiians had to say.
It was a historic moment, for 
although there were many debates, 
arguments, signs of mistrust, and 
threats of withdrawal, on the final day 
all who remained (the State Hawaiian 
Homesteaders Association left in 
protest the day before) agreed on 
several important principles. The fore-
most of these was that Hawaiians 
wanted all two million acres of Hawai-
ian Trust Lands returned to their con-
trol and not a single acre less. There 
would be no deal made to diminish the 
trust lands by any Hawaiian present; 
even hsec representatives agreed.
A second Ho‘omalu ma Kualoa was 
held in April 1997 and agreed that a 
series of educational workshops must 
be presented to the people before fur-
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third Ho‘omalu ma Kualoa to be held 
in October 1997. Issues such as cul-
tural rights, land trusts, and different 
forms of sovereignty needed to be 
addressed at their own conferences. 
After a base of understanding of legal 
terms and arguments has been created, 
then the various groups will reconvene 
to decide how best to proceed toward 
political unification in order to fight 
for control over the Hawaiian Trust 
Lands.
Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i has proposed a 
confederation of all groups, perhaps 
similar to that formed by the Alaska 
Natives in their struggle with the 
American government over their lands. 
The Mâori Congress is another model 
that could be considered. The Hawai-
ian Sovereignty Elections Council 
prefers a Hawaiian constitutional 
convention, which they estimate will 
cost $8 million to be paid from three 
sources: the Hawai‘i State Legislature, 
oha, and private fund-raising. Other 
Hawaiians prefer some measure of 
autonomy and no state interference. 
Ka Lâhui Hawai‘i is reluctant in the 
extreme to relinquish its own constitu-
tion, and is wary of the state plan for 
selecting delegates for an hsec consti-
tutional convention.
Without a doubt, Hawaiians would 
come to agreement faster if the State of 
Hawai‘i would withdraw from the 
issue and leave it for the Natives to 
decide. The state contends that it is 
only trying to help the Hawaiian 
people. However, if the state truly 
wanted to support Hawaiian self-
determination it would abolish ward-
ship and let the Hawaiian people 
retake control of their ancestral home-land. The state is precluded from such 
action by its own self-interest, insofar 
as most “state” land is actually Hawai-
ian Trust Land, and when Hawaiians 
regain that land base it will be the 
State of Hawai‘i that must beg permis-
sion from Hawaiians to use the land.
LILIKALÂ kame‘eleihiwa
MÂORI Issues
The year 1996 saw major and historic 
changes for Mâori on the political 
scene. The mixed-member-propor-
tional-representation election system 
was used in New Zealand for the first 
time in the October general elections 
and delivered 15 Mâori members of 
parliament out of a total of 120. It 
more than doubled the number of 
Mâori that have ever been in the 
House, but is still less than the 15 
percent of the population that Mâori 
make up.
The reaction from Mâori was one 
of unrestrained delight and outpour-
ings of hope for a better future. But 
there was little comment in the main-
stream media, although one of the 
more perceptive commentators noted 
that it was a “major Maori political 
assertion which left this supposed 
colonised community holding the 
balance of power, something which 
had remained beyond their grasp since 
the mid-1850s despite both armed and 
passive resistance. . . . Now there are 
15 rather than the traditional four 
Maori MPs [and] they are spread 
across all parties in Parliament. This 
represents a shift of revolutionary 
proportions” (Brooking 1996).
Mâori success in the polls further 
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Mâori population of Mâori having any 
say in the affairs of the country. Public 
attacks on Mâori have increased in 
frequency and vehemence, fueled by an 
often hostile, unsympathetic, and 
uninformed mainstream non-Mâori 
news media. Mâori were not unmoved 
by the attacks, and in March the prized 
yachting trophy, the America’s Cup, 
was badly damaged when a young 
Mâori protester attacked it. He was 
highlighting the ongoing injustices 
borne by Mâori, including increasing 
Mâori poverty and deprivation. In 
June 1997 the reality of Mâori poverty 
was brought starkly into focus when 
three Mâori children were killed in a 
fire that destroyed their home in a 
remote Mâori settlement. Their home 
was a temporary shelter, and the fire 
was caused by a candle used for 
lighting.
The elections resulted in all five 
Mâori electorate seats being taken by 
the New Zealand First party. This was 
a major swing away from the Labour 
party, which Mâori had supported for 
over sixty years. The only other Mâori 
to gain an electorate seat was the New 
Zealand First party leader and later 
deputy prime minister and treasurer, 
the Honourable Winston Peters. The 
remaining nine Mâori members of 
Parliament all gained their seats as a 
result of the number of seats their 
party won in the House.
No party received a clear majority. 
With National and Labour holding the 
great majority of seats between them, 
it fell to the third-ranking New 
Zealand First party to determine which 
party it would enter a coalition with to 
form a government. Mâori were strongly in favor of a coalition with 
Labour, for although they had deserted 
that party during the elections, it was 
still far preferred over the conservative 
National party, whose Mâori policies 
had caused much upheaval in recent 
times. Given that 6 of the 17 New 
Zealand First members, including the 
leader, are Mâori, there was some 
confidence that the Mâori wish would 
prevail.
In the event, Mâori were stunned 
when New Zealand First chose to form 
a coalition government with the 
National party. However the coalition 
agreement appeared to address at least 
some major Mâori concerns with 
National party policies, and in particu-
lar included an undertaking to aban-
don the loathed “fiscal envelope” 
policy for settling Mâori land clams. 
As such, there was no angry outburst, 
but rather a philosophical wait-and-see 
reaction. After all, there were now five 
Mâori electorate representatives on the 
government benches, with an unprece-
dented three Mâori in cabinet, one of 
them the deputy prime minister and 
treasurer. Furthermore the Mâori 
cabinet members included a Mâori 
minister of Mâori Affairs who would 
be much more inclined to dedicate 
himself to making that portfolio work 
for Mâori rather than against them as 
had been the case with the previous 
minister.
Once the government was 
announced, and new members started 
making their maiden speeches, the 
mainstream news media embarked on 
a campaign of discrediting each Mâori 
member of the House, both new and 
old. They were baying for Mâori 
blood, and every whiff of it sent them 
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members of Parliament it was their 
first time in the House, and many of 
them fell easy prey to the hypercritical 
and strongly eurocentric press gallery. 
It also ensured that they were diverted 
from learning and carrying out their 
jobs as members of Parliament.
It started with the very experienced 
leader of New Zealand First, Winston 
Peters, soon after the elections in 
October 1996, for a disturbance in a 
nightclub. In November, it was the 
deputy leader, Tau Henare, for speak-
ing out of turn during the coalition 
negotiations. From January to April 
1997 it was Tuku Morgan for his role 
in the establishment of a new Mâori 
television station. In February, 
Winston Peters again, this time for 
bumping into another member of Par-
liament a little harder than necessary, 
and Tau Henare for wearing wrap-
around sunglasses in public. In March, 
it was Tuariki Delamare for problems 
with his children, and Donna Awatere 
for unpaid parking fines from several 
years ago. Tariana Turia came in for a 
sustained blasting for daring to articu-
late Mâori aspirations of self-determi-
nation in her maiden speech and 
referring to non-Mâori as tauiwi or 
foreigners. The backgrounds of both 
Alamein Kopu and Ron Marks were 
too humble, and Dover Samuels had 
problems with his people at home. In 
May, it was Tutekawa Wyllie for not 
declaring nz$1,350 in election expen-
diture (while others under investiga-
tion were not named). By breaking an 
unwritten rule between Mâori mem-
bers of Parliament about not publicly 
attacking each other, Sandra Lee 
managed to attract prominent media coverage that only served to display 
her own lack of understanding of 
Mâori protocol and politics.
To date, the one Mâori member of 
Parliament to be spared public ridicule 
by the media has been the only Mâori 
in the National party caucus, Georgina 
Te Heuheu, a naturally unassuming 
and quietly hardworking person. A 
lawyer by training, Mrs Te Heuheu 
was a member of the Waitangi Trib-
unal until she entered Parliament.
The nature of the attacks became 
quite ridiculous, with one particular 
Mâori member, Tuku Morgan, him-
self a journalist, steadfastly refusing to 
compromise the Mâori right to be 
Mâori both in and outside Parliament. 
His perceived arrogance toward the 
Pâkehâ domination of the House and 
the country turned his former 
colleagues into a virtual lynch mob 
against him. They identified his role in 
a new and struggling Mâori television 
station, and successfully hounded the 
station out of existence. For weeks 
they created headlines out of the fact 
that Morgan had paid nz$89 for an 
item of underwear while working for 
the station. The government asked the 
Serious Fraud Office to investigate, 
and the media frenzy finally fell silent 
when they returned a decision that 
Morgan had done nothing illegal. In 
May he auctioned off the item of 
underwear to help raise money to 
assist a young cancer sufferer.
By comparison, events such as the 
auditor-general being jailed for fraud, 
a judge pleading guilty to fraud, 
another being charged with the 
offense, and a third being charged with 
child molestation, a multimillion-
dollar bungle by a government depart-
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a moth threatening ornamental trees in 
a wealthy Auckland suburb, the 
dismissal of the heads of the Serious 
Fraud Office and the Department of 
Conservation, and a member of Parlia-
ment spending nz$29,000 on taxi 
fares were all relegated to the inner 
pages of the major daily newspapers, 
while Mâori members of Parliament 
were attacked on the front page. Tele-
vision and radio were little better.
While the news media were openly 
antagonistic toward Mâori, the Wai-
tangi Tribunal and the courts contin-
ued to deliver decisions and findings in 
support of them. In December the 
Privy Council ruled that the courts 
could not decide on matters of Mâori 
social structure, and overturned a 
Court of Appeal decision that had 
declared recently formed urban Mâori 
corporate bodies to have the same 
status as traditional iwi (tribes). In 
March the District Court upheld the 
customary rights of Mâori to fish their 
ancestral fishing grounds in rivers 
without having to obtain a license to 
do so. Soon after, the long-awaited 
report on the Muriwhenua land claims 
was released by the Waitangi Tribunal. 
It signaled a whole new approach to 
the consideration of land transactions 
between Mâori and Pâkehâ last 
century and has major implications for 
land claims throughout the rest of the 
country.
The Muriwhenua Land Report 
found that through a myriad of dis-
honorable and illegal acts, the Crown 
had deprived Muriwhenua Mâori of 
the Far North of nearly all their lands 
before 1865. The report was the first 
to consider the Mâori interpretation of early land transactions between Mâori 
on the one hand, and English mission-
aries and Crown agents on the other. 
The Crown had always assumed and 
argued vehemently before the tribunal 
that the transactions were English 
custom land sales that extinguished the 
Mâori title to them. The claimants 
argued equally vehemently that the 
notion of “land sale” did not exist in 
Mâori culture at the time and that the 
transactions were Mâori custom tuku 
whenua, which gave usufructuary but 
not proprietary rights to the land. The 
weight of evidence produced by both 
parties strongly favored the claimants, 
and the tribunal found accordingly, 
concluding that Mâori title to their 
lands had never been extinguished.
However, the tribunal went further 
and examined the social and economic 
circumstances of the Muriwhenua 
tribes that resulted from this landless-
ness. They reported that the tribes 
were reduced to “penury, powerless-
ness and eventually state dependence” 
and that “Muriwhenua Maori became 
and still are, a people at risk.” It also 
said that the transactions “point to 
clear breaches by the Crown of treaty 
principles, including those of protec-
tion, honourable conduct, fair process 
and recognition” and that profound 
social and economic consequences 
resulted, with hapu suffering physical 
deprivation, poverty, social disloca-
tion, and loss of status. The tribunal 
reported that recommendations should 
be made as soon as possible to give the 
tribes relief, and that for the first time 
since they were empowered to do so in 
1988, they would use their powers to 
order the return of Crown forest and 
state-owned enterprise lands.
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to strongly condemn the tribunal for 
daring to say it might use its only 
power to make order and to warn 
Muriwhenua Mâori that they should 
put aside any hope of being delivered 
justice as a result of their successful 
claims. That apart, its reaction was 
very similar to that for the 1996 
Taranaki Report: muted, urging every-
one to read the report but not subsi-
dizing its publication so that the 
nz$100 price tag would ensure that 
only a few people would read it. In the 
meantime the government was desper-
ate to get Muriwhenua claimants to 
settle without getting orders from the 
tribunal. This had less to do with the 
nz$60 million dollars in compensation 
and approximately 50,000 acres of 
land the tribunal could order to be 
returned to the Muriwhenua tribes, 
and more to do with the precedent it 
would set for other much larger 
Crown forests, where the compensa-
tion alone is worth between nz$7-and-
8 billion. That would completely blow 
apart the ridiculously low nz$1 billion 
budgeted to settle all Mâori claims, 
even though it is less than two years of 
the budget for the Social Welfare 
Department.
The government refused to provide 
either funding or resources to assist the 
tribes to prepare for entering into 
negotiations. Then in June the three 
children died in the fire in Muri-
whenua, and the conditions of poverty 
in the area were put on display for the 
whole country to see. The government 
was severely criticized for allowing 
such conditions to continue to exist, 
but remained unmoved. The Muri-
whenua tribes announced that they were returning to the tribunal and 
would be demanding that urgent steps 
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Niue
Following its victory in the 1996 elec-
tions, the government of Premier 
Frank Lui had little difficulty main-
taining its majority in the Niue Assem-
bly. This stability contrasted with the 
previous term’s internal bickering, 
which led in turn to dismissals of 
cabinet ministers, challenges to the 
premier, the formation of the opposi-
tion Niue People’s Party (npp), and the 
lengthy deadlock in the Assembly 
(Levine 1996, 191–193). With only a 
small majority in the Assembly, how-
ever, the government’s position 
remained precarious.
The death in October 1996 of 
Toeono Tongatule, one of the six 
Assembly members elected on the 
islandwide “common roll,” gave the 
Lui government an opportunity to 
enlarge its majority. Tongatule had 
been an npp supporter, and the party 
initially indicated that it would be 
supporting his widow, Mrs Tiva 
Tongatule, in its bid to retain the seat. 
If she had been successful, she would 
have been the second woman in the 
twenty-seat Assembly and the first 
woman npp member.
As Niue’s only political party, the 
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the by-election on its ability to remain 
united. Unfortunately for the party, 
Terry Chapman—its former president, 
who had been an unsuccessful candi-
date in the general election—also con-
tested the seat. In all, the 15 February 
1997 by-election attracted ten candi-
dates (as well as most of the island’s 
voters) and was won by Billy Talagi, a 
former npp candidate who had 
defected to the government weeks 
before the by-election. His majority 
over Mrs Tongatule was only 81 (275 
votes, against her 194), and 9 votes 
less than Chapman’s 90-vote total.
The Niue People’s Party’s numbers 
in the Assembly slipped further follow-
ing the by-election. Common roll 
member Fisa Pihigia also left the party, 
and by mid-1997 its numbers in the 
Assembly had been reduced to 6 
(Robert Rex, Jr, and five supporters), 
against the government’s 14 seats.
Although the government’s victory 
in the by-election was influenced by 
various factors, including family and 
personality considerations, its perfor-
mance at the polls also reflected its 
activities since retaining office in the 
1996 election. The government pro-
ceeded with efforts to upgrade Niue’s 
telephone system, installing a cell-
phone system around the island (paid 
for in part by drawing on the govern-
ment’s reserves). The cellphone 
network provides a better commu-
nications system, particularly for those 
living in villages on the eastern side of 
Niue. The cellphone system required 
the erection of two 60-meter-high cell-
phone towers, one at Makefu and the 
other at Avatele. To help pay for the 
project, Niue Telecoms had been hop-ing to increase phone charges. At 
present, however, a mobile phone costs 
more than nz$500, and the telephone 
company already has its difficulties 
with outstanding accounts.
The program for sealing the cross-
island road also continued, arguably of 
some relevance in the by-election,
since the late Mr Tongatule had lived 
at Hakupu. The government was
able to complete the paving of roads 
from the capital, Alofi, to Lakepa, 
Liku, and Hakupu (about 30 kilome-
ters), making for a considerable 
improvement from the potholed coral 
it was replacing.
Perhaps the most important—
certainly the most expensive—eco-
nomic development during the 1996–
97 year was the opening of the new 
24-room Matavai Resort. Built with 
New Zealand financial assistance, the 
nz$3 million project (including cost 
overruns) was completed in September 
1996. However, Niue’s tourist industry 
remains weak; the week that Matavai 
opened, there were only six tourists on 
the island and the government-owned 
32-room Niue Hotel stood completely 
empty. With both the Niue Hotel and 
the Matavai Resort, the Niue govern-
ment could be said to be competing 
with itself: it holds 51 percent of the 
shares in Matavai. The resort was 
officially opened by the governor-
general of New Zealand and of Niue, 
Sir Michael Hardie Boys, in April. 
Within two months, directors were 
describing the resort as facing finan-
cial problems, which they attributed
to the high airfares charged by Royal 
Tongan Airlines (which has now
been appointed Niue’s national 
carrier).
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made possible the resumption of direct 
service between Niue and New 
Zealand, inaugurating Auckland–Niue 
flights in October, with air links to 
Niue through Tonga also being contin-
ued. An additional air service to Niue 
is being provided by Samoa Air, with 
flights from Pago Pago, American 
Sâmoa.
With completion in recent years of 
two major special projects (the airport 
resurfacing and extension, to accom-
modate 767 and fully-loaded 737 
aircraft, and the Matavai Resort) 
large-scale funding from New Zealand 
was bound to be reduced. Budgetary 
aid to Niue was cut in mid-1996 by 
nz$250,000, to nz$4.5 million, with 
further funding available for special 
projects. At the same time, the govern-
ment’s budget predicted a deficit in 
1997 of nz$329,000, despite major 
reductions in government spending 
(from nz$25.8 million in 1995–96 to 
nz$19.9 million in 1996–97). Most of 
the shortfall can be attributed to fund-
ing the cellphone system (requiring 
loan finance), a nz$250,000 subsidy 
to Royal Tongan Airlines, and supple-
mentary funding for the Matavai 
Resort. The budget for 1997–98 antici-
pated spending of nz$20.5 million
and revenue of nz$20.3 million.
The prospect of another deficit 
(nz$200,000) comes at the same time 
as New Zealand continues to slice 
roughly the same amount from its 
annual aid package, which is expected 
to fall further, from nz$4.5 million
to nz$4.25 million (with special-
project funding remaining at nz$2.57 
million). Attempts to trim the govern-
ment’s deficit at the expense of the public service have been challenged. 
The president of the Niue Public 
Service Association, Maru Talagi (the 
director of Public Works), was sus-
pended by the Public Service Commis-
sion after suggesting that members 
would discuss direct action if there 
were reductions in either staff numbers 
or salaries.
Niue’s population has apparently 
continued to shrink—according to 
unofficial estimates—dropping to 
around 2,000 (from more than 2,300
in the last census, a drop of about 5 
percent per year; Guest 1997, 3). 
Several families from Tuvalu have 
moved to Niue following an agreement 
between both governments. The fami-
lies have been settled in Vaiea, follow-
ing government refurbishing of homes 
left abandoned after the mass exodus 
of villagers in the 1970s. It is not 
expected that an intake of Tuvaluans 
will resolve Niue’s chronic population 
problems.
While further improvements have 
been made at the airport—extensions 
to the international terminal, new 
check-in and baggage-handling areas, 
a more spacious and comfortable exit 
and entry to Niue—these are of little 
value if the tourists are not coming to 
the island. This failure to come is 
despite a considerable investment 
being made to attract them: comparing 
the amount spent by the tourist 
authority with the number of tourists, 
it appears that Niue is spending about 
nz$300 per visitor (Guest 1996, 4). In 
a typical week there are more consult-
ants and volunteer workers on Niue 
than tourists. Between January and 
April 1997, only 137 tourists visited 
Niue (according to Niue’s Department 
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ment’s two hotels for about a week. In 
an effort to place Niue more conspicu-
ously on the map, the Niue Tourist 
Authority decided to change the 
island’s slogan, “Discover Tranquil-
lity,” to the more dynamic “Discover 
Adventure.” Somewhat ironically, but 
in a show of integrity, the island’s tour-
ist operators objected, arguing that 
Niue’s activities (apart perhaps from 
the dive shop) were not accurately por-
trayed in the new emphasis. Subse-
quently the Niue slogan—at least for 
tourist purposes—was changed to 
“Niue—the Rock of Polynesia.”
The major challenge facing Niue 
has to do with expanding employment 
opportunities for its young people. A 
survey found that about half of the 
island’s youth plan to leave, citing low 
wages and a lack of jobs, recreation, 
and freedom. The building of the cell-
phone towers, the Matavai Resort, and 
the new alpaca quarantine station 
provided some employment opportu-
nities, but these were necessarily short-
term.
Many recent government-sponsored 
economic initiatives continue to floun-
der. The afforestation scheme (Levine 
1995, 158) has slowed because of the 
lack of availability of leased land and 
reductions in aid funding. Niue’s taro 
exports face tough competition in New 
Zealand from products from Fiji and 
Western Sâmoa. However, support has 
continued for efforts to expand coco-
nut and taro exports, including the 
Moui Faka Niue taro export scheme, 
although price reductions have led to 
growers receiving less money than pre-
viously. Lower
prices invariably lead to a reductionin the number of bags of taro being 
exported (and the total revenue being 
received).
A more promising and innovative 
venture centers around the alpaca 
quarantine station, which was com-
pleted by Australian construction 
workers. The quarantine station is a 
privately funded nz$1 million project 
—apparently the first private quaran-
tine station in the South Pacific—
which will earn Niue around 
nz$250,000 annually. The area has the 
capacity to house roughly 1,500 
alpacas, brought in from Peru, to be 
used for breeding purposes in Austra-
lia. The first planeload of 300 animals 
arrived on Niue in November. By early 
1997, 600 alpacas had settled into 
their new home at Vaiea for at least 
twelve months before being taken to 
farms in Australia. Cattle and sheep 
have also been moved to the station to 
determine whether any diseases will be 
transferred from these animals to the 
alpacas. At the same time, the number 
of alpacas continues to grow, with 
around 500 giving birth since arrival, 
and a mating program was begun in 
February. It has been noted that the 
growth of alpacas is far outstripping 
growth in tourist numbers.
The project’s apparent success has 
led to plans for Niue to be used as 
quarantine facilities for equestrian 
horses in the Sydney Olympics in 
2000. All overseas entrants in the 
equestrian events would be flown to 
Niue, along with their handlers, 
providing business for Niue hotels
and restaurants (and growers).
Another venture—the leasing of 
international telephone-code access 
lines—was less unambiguously suc-
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when it transpired that at least some of 
the lines were being used for live sex 
calls. The codes had been leased by 
Asia Pacific Telecommunications and 
sold to companies whose calls were 
rerouted through Niue. Niue Tele-
coms contacted companies using lines 
for this purpose after callers using
the sex lines misdialed and rang sub-
scribers on Niue (in the middle of the 
night). After Niue Telecom’s success in 
identifying companies breaching their 
contracts by using their lines for this 
purpose, the company’s reported 
income from leasing was expected to 
drop substantially, from nz$2 million 
to nz$1.4 million.
Other government measures have 
focused on road safety, a concern of 
residents, visitors, and the New 
Zealand and Niue governments. 
Drunken-driving accidents are respon-
sible for a significant proportion of the 
accidents requiring emergency flights 
to New Zealand for hospital treat-
ment. While new legislation permits 
fourteen-year-olds to drive cars, the 
age limit for those driving trucks has 
been raised to eighteen, while bus
drivers must now be at least twenty. It 
may be argued that even these age 
requirements make the abandoned 
tourist slogan, “Discover Adventure,” 
worth a second look. Further legisla-
tion providing for breath testing and 
increased fines seems inevitable. Com-
pulsory seat belts are also likely. These 
moves are largely a response to com-
plaints from New Zealand about the 
high number of emergency air force 
medivacs (at a cost of around nz$1 
million in 1996). About 50 percent of 
the patients evacuated to Auckland hospitals had been involved in alcohol-
related accidents. Niue’s approxi-
mately 2,000 people have about 600 
registered vehicles on the road. Unfor-
tunately requests to foreign govern-
ments for financial assistance to build 
a new hospital on Niue have thus far 
been unsuccessful, reflecting the 
emphasis now being given by aid 
donors to projects likely to generate 
economic growth and capital invest-
ment.
Following the collapse of the gov-
ernment’s prosecution of former 
Finance Minister Sani Lakatani 
(Levine 1997, 240), anticorruption 
and bribery laws were enacted by the 
Assembly. The new legislation closes a 
loophole in present legislation, and 
imposes prison sentences of up to four-
teen years for bribery or corruption of 
judicial officers, cabinet ministers, 
members of the Assembly, police offic-
ers, and government officials. Ulti-
mately all 26 charges of bribery and 
corruption were dropped against 
Lakatani, with the case costing the 
Niue government more than 
nz$250,000 in legal fees.
The government also introduced 
legislation of wider interest to the 
Pacific region. One measure was aimed 
at stopping the transportation and 
dumping of nuclear waste within 
Niue’s two-hundred-mile exclusive 
economic zone. There are concerns 
that foreign vessels, loaded with 
nuclear waste, may be moving through 
Niue’s waters. Niue also revised its 
fishing laws in an attempt to stop for-
eign driftnet-fishing vessels from work-
ing inside its waters. Fines for illegal 
fishing were raised to nz$250,000, 
and there is provision for Niue ob-
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Niue has been considering a further 
modest expansion of its international 
organizational links. The prospect of 
joining the Food and Agriculture 
Organization does not appear to have 
elicited the enthusiasm that sur-
rounded earlier applications to who 
and unesco (Levine 1995, 155–156). 
Given Niue’s precarious economic 
position, the high cost of membership 
is an issue that needs to be considered 
against possible benefits to the island 
and its people.
A potpourri of ideas continues to be 
advanced on Niue in an effort to make 
the island more attractive to residents 
and overseas interests. Consideration 
is being given to establishing an 
English-language school for Chinese 
students. The government is also 
exploring the possibility of changing 
the dateline so that it will be in the 
same time zone as New Zealand. Niue 
is presently 23 hours behind New 
Zealand. About eighteen hundred 
companies have so far signed on to 
Niue’s International Business Centre 
register. Income from these registra-
tions and offshore banking is predicted 
to earn about nz$400,000 in 1997—
less than originally anticipated, but 
still a significant contribution. There 
may be further privatization of some 
government activities, including corpo-
ratization of Telecom, Forestry, the 
Power Supply Services, and Water 
Supply. The sale of the Niue Hotel is 
also a possibility, assuming that there 
is a suitable purchaser.
Problems with Niue’s wharf remain 
unresolved. The channel is still not 
deep enough to permit ships to tie up at the reconstructed Alofi wharf, 
despite repairs following the damage 
inflicted by the New Zealand Navy 
(costing nz$700,000 to repair). Fur-
thermore, the entire episode still leaves 
cargo ships in the position of needing 
to offload their produce onto barges. A 
feasibility study being carried out by 
the South Pacific Geophysical Agency 
is now underway to determine whether 
the wharf can be extended 20–30 
meters. The extension would provide 
greater depth in the channel to allow 
cargo ships to tie up alongside the 
wharf. The US Government has given 
Niue nz$100,000 to assist with wharf 
extensions, which will probably be 
carried out by a US naval engineering 
unit (the “Seabees”).
Although US Peace Corps volun-
teers contribute needed skills on Niue 
in several areas—information services, 
small business advice, accountancy, 
agriculture, and education—Niueans 
continue to advance in the professions. 
The government’s appointment of 
twenty-two-year-old Peleni Talagi as 
Crown Counsel is particularly note-
worthy, as she is the first Niuean 
woman to be admitted to the New 
Zealand bar. Another Niuean lawyer, 
Togia Sioneholo, is registrar of Niue’s 
High Court.
Some may hope that the filling of 
such positions by well-educated, well-
qualified young Niueans may encour-
age others. Many young Niueans 
studying overseas choose not to return. 
The overall cost of overseas tertiary 
education for Niuean students will 
vary, but those studying in New 
Zealand can expect to spend about 
nz$80,000 per person. While those on 
scholarship are “obligated” to return 
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often broken by graduates attracted by 
the prospect of higher paid employ-
ment in New Zealand and a more 
diversified, urban lifestyle.
Another appointment successfully 
avoided controversy. The director of 
education, Atapana Siakimotu, was 
appointed Niue’s consul-general in 
Auckland, taking up the post in June 
1997 for a three-year term. The 
appointment of his predecessor had 
attracted criticism, as it was the first 
appointment of a Niuean New 
Zealand resident to the position and 
the first time such an appointment had 
been made outside the Niue Public 
Service.
Niue’s 22nd Constitution Day cele-
brations in October were subdued, 
with emphasis given instead to the 
150th anniversary of Niue’s first over-
seas trained missionary, Peniamina, 
trained in Western Sâmoa by the 
London Missionary Society. The 
commemoration took place during a 
period when many Niue residents were 
having difficulty meeting ongoing 
commitments: telephone accounts, 
broadcasting license fees, payments
on mortgages, and other loans. Never-
theless there is a “hidden economy” 
escaping statistical measurement and 
the taxation system. There is a high 
volume of imports—nz$4.8 million 
for food and beverages and a further 
nz$680,000 for motor vehicles in 
1996—and nearly a million dollars 
was spent on hair-cutting and ear-
piercing ceremonies.
As noted, Niue has managed to 
develop some additional revenue 
sources in recent years, including inter-
national phone-access coding, fishing licenses, quarantine station rental, and 
international business registrations. 
Yet its prospects still seem shaky, if not 
bleak: falling population numbers, a 
budget deficit, a minuscule tourist 
industry (notwithstanding major 
investments in the airport and in hotel 
developments, including funding for 
consultants and tourist promotion), 
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SÂMOA
The second half of 1996 to the first 
half of 1997 was dominated by issues 
relating to the by-elections following 
the general elections in April 1996, the 
ongoing court cases between the chief 
auditor and controller of finance and 
the government, the dispute between 
Vaiusu village and the government 
over land previously under the control 
of the Western Sâmoa Trust Estate 
Corporation (wstec), the passport 
scandal, and the country’s change of 
name from Western Sâmoa to Sâmoa.
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in April 1996 saw the Human Rights 
Protection Party (hrpp) winning 24 
seats, the opposition Sâmoa National 
Development Party (sndp) 11 seats, 
the Sâmoa Labour Party (slp) 1, and 
13 independents. By the time of the 
first session of Parliament to elect a 
new government, at least 5 of the 
independents had joined the hrpp 
(Faugagana, 14 May 1996). Of the
49 seats in Parliament, the hrpp now 
occupied 29, ensuring it another five 
years in office. Independents joined the 
hrpp for various reasons, including 
personal reasons: “been enticed by 
possible portfolio and other positions” 
(Faugagana, 14 May 1996); some had 
stood as independents because of an 
hrpp policy that the sitting members 
of Parliament were the party’s official 
nomination. However, considering 
that at least twelve electoral petitions 
had been filed by both the opposition 
candidates and the hrpp, the party’s 
grip on power was by no means 
secure.
Four hrpp members retained their 
seats when petitions against them were 
later withdrawn (Savali, 7 July 1996). 
Decisions to withdraw electoral peti-
tions followed customary meetings 
between candidates and their support-
ers, and between them and rival candi-
dates and their respective supporters. 
In one meeting, a high-ranking matai 
(Samoan titleholder) who supported 
the election-night winner convinced a 
candidate who had filed the petition to 
withdraw it by pointing out in a tradi-
tional speech that the petitioner and 
the election-night winner were blood 
relations. He proved his point by 
reciting the genealogies of the two candidates, which went back several 
generations. The occasion became so 
emotional that the petitioner was in 
tears during the recitation of genealo-
gies. Presentations of gifts (such as fine 
mats, cash, and food) by the election 
winners always follow such meetings.
Election-night winners who either 
did not initiate customary meetings, or 
did instigate meetings but were unable 
to convince the petitioners and their 
respective supporters to withdraw 
their petitions, had to go through the 
due process of law. The outgoing 
speaker of the house, Afamasaga Fatu 
Va‘ili, filed a petition against the elec-
tion-night winner, To‘alepaiali‘i 
Si‘ueva (a former cabinet minister and 
leader of the newly formed slp). Sev-
eral customary attempts by To‘ale-
paiali‘i to have Afamasaga withdraw 
his petition were unsuccessful (SO, 13 
Aug 1996). Claims and counterclaims 
of treating, bribery, and undue influ-
ence by Afamasaga and To‘alepaiali‘i 
respectively were upheld by the 
Supreme Court in June. Consequently, 
not only was the result of the April 
election declared void, but both candi-
dates, in accordance with the electoral 
act, would not be eligible to run in the 
upcoming by-election at Aana Alofi 3 
constituency (SO, 28 July 1996). 
Tole‘afoa Fa‘amatala, who had 
recently resigned his diplomatic post
in Belgium where he was Western 
Sâmoa’s ambassador to the European 
Community, contested the Aana
Alofi 3 seat as the hrpp’s candidate 
and won.
The Aana Alofi 3 by-election was 
deferred for two months. The leader of 
the Samoa All People’s Party (sapp), 
Matatumua Maimoaga, following the 
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had been added to Aana Alofi 3’s elec-
toral roll for the April election, filed an 
application in the Supreme Court to 
stop the by-election because the addi-
tional voters breached article 1, 13A of 
the 1991 Electoral Amendment Act 
(SO, 28 July 1996). It stated that “the 
main roll and supplementary roll 
which were used at the election which 
has been voided shall be used at the 
by-election without any amendment or 
addition.” Matatumua’s application 
was successful, thus preventing the by-
election that was meant to have been 
held on 1 August (SO, 4 Aug 1996). 
The electoral office responded by 
applying to the Supreme Court to have 
the interim injunction, which stopped 
the Aana Alofi 3 by-election, lifted. 
When the electoral office’s applica-
tion was dismissed by Chief Justice 
Tiava‘asu‘e Falefatu Sapolu, the gov-
ernment then filed an application in 
the country’s Court of Appeal to have 
the Supreme Court’s decision reversed. 
The government’s appeal was success-
ful, thereby allowing the Aana Alofi 3 
by-election to go ahead. It was held on 
4 October.
The electoral office argued that 
because To‘alepaiali‘i had resigned his 
seat before the court decision was 
handed down, it was within its legal 
prerogatives to declare the date for the 
Aana Alofi 3 by-election and to regis-
ter additional voters in the constitu-
ency’s electoral roll. Furthermore, 
Parliament on 18 June ordered the 
Speaker of the House to fill the 
vacancy following To‘alepaiali‘i’s resig-
nation. The chief justice upheld 
Matatumua’s argument because “I am 
of the view that the real reason for To‘alepaiali‘i Si‘ueva resigning his seat 
was because of the evidence put before 
this court in the electoral petition 
against him” (so, 4 Aug 1996). The 
decision was later reversed in the 
Court of Appeal.
As in Aana Alofi 3, the electoral 
petitions in the constituencies of 
Satupa‘itea and Falealili—where 
claims and counterclaims of illegal 
electoral practices by the petitioners 
and defenders respectively were sub-
stantiated—resulted not only in the 
results of the April election being 
declared void but in the disqualifica-
tion of concerned candidates who 
would have contested the constituen-
cies’ by-elections. In Satupa‘itea, the 
election of the hrpp candidate, Tavu‘i 
Lene, was declared void in the 
Supreme Court on 11 July. The argu-
ment by the petitioner, Asiata 
Sale‘imoa Va‘ai—an independent 
candidate—that the twenty tala ($20) 
he gave one of his voters on the day of 
the election was dictated by compas-
sion was not acceptable to the chief 
justice. Furthermore, because Asiata 
had not fulfilled the residency require-
ment for a parliamentary candidate, 
having returned to the country from 
doctoral studies in Australia just four 
months before, he, like Tavu‘i, was 
disqualified from contesting the by-
election.
After the result of the electoral peti-
tion was known, Asiata and his sup-
porters nominated one of their number 
as their candidate for the by-election. 
Like Asiata, the candidate, Gafa Ioelu, 
stood as an independent. He won the 
seat by 377 votes to his nearest rival’s 
336 (SO, 29 Sept 1996). On 26 Septem-
ber, Gafa was escorted by Asiata to the 
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also ran as an independent but was an 
sndp member of the last parliament) 
had rejoined not long after the April 
elections. Asiata’s father and his hrpp 
supporters left the hrpp in early 1985, 
following a disagreement among party 
members over the party leadership. 
Asiata’s request on the day of the 
handing over, that “their candidate” 
be considered by the prime minister for 
a ministerial post, was not realized. 
However, the replacement of the out-
going minister of Post Office and Tele-
communication (following the 
dissolution of his seat by a court order, 
when claims of electoral malpractices 
against him in the April elections were 
proven) by Asiata’s older brother on 
10 November went some way to recip-
rocating the support of Asiata, his 
family, and his supporters.
The election petition against one of 
the two members of Parliament for 
Falealili constituency (a cabinet minis-
ter in the last parliament) saw the 
former minister lose his seat. He and 
the petitioner were also disqualified 
from contesting the constituency’s by-
election when claims and counter-
claims of electoral malpractices against 
them were proven in court (SO, 24 July 
1996). Another hrpp candidate, Leilua 
Punivalu (who had recently resigned 
his post as Western Sâmoa’s consul in 
Auckland, an hrpp member in an 
earlier parliament, and brother of the 
outgoing Speaker), won the by-election 
on 27 September. On 8 November, 
Leilua’s older brother, Muagututia 
Samuelu, won another constituency’s 
by-election. This victory followed the 
disqualification by the court of Tolo-
fuaivalelei’s seat. Tolofuaivalelei, the minister of Post Office and Telecom-
munication, not only lost his seat but 
was disqualified from contesting the 
by-election when electoral malprac-
tices against him were proven in court.
All electoral charges against the 
minister of Internal and Women’s 
Affairs, veteran politician Polataivao 
Fosi, were dismissed in court on 19 
August. The petitioner, Matagi 
Tanumaga—an sndp candidate—
claimed that a number of customary 
resolutions at his village (the same one 
of which Polataivao is also a matai) 
adversely affected his chances of being 
elected. They included a village council 
understanding that tulafale (talking 
chiefs) should not contest parliamen-
tary seats when an ali‘i (high chief) was 
standing as a candidate. He also 
claimed that because he and his family 
had been suspended from the village
at the time of the elections, it was diffi-
cult for him and his supporters to 
launch an effective campaign. Further-
more, his suspension had resulted
from his refusal to give in to village 
council pressure that he withdraw his 
candidacy.
The electoral petition against 
Tofaeono Anufesaina, an hrpp candi-
date, by Tupuola Sola Siaosi, an sndp 
candidate and the member for Siumu 
constituency in the previous parlia-
ment, resulted in Tofaeono not only 
losing her seat but being disqualified 
from contesting the by-election. Coun-
terclaims against Tupuola were not 
proven in court. With Tofaeono’s 
disqualification, her son-in-law, Tu‘u‘u 
Anasi‘i, was nominated by
the hrpp as its candidate for the by-
election. Tu‘u‘u won the by-election on 
27 September by 411 votes to his near-
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by-elections and the defection to the 
hrpp of one of the sndp members of 
parliament on 26 September brought 
to 36 the number of hrpp members in 
the country’s 49-seat parliament 
(Savali, 15 Nov 1996). While this 
majority ensures the hrpp smooth pas-
sage of any bill it submits before Par-
liament, it is feared by some members 
of the public, as it would mean that the 
hrpp could do anything they decide in 
the absence of any effective parliamen-
tary opposition.
The issues relating to the controller 
and chief auditor originated from a 
report by the chief auditor that was 
submitted to Parliament on 6 July 
1994, in which he was critical of many 
government departments and other 
bodies. In short, the chief auditor 
pointed toward corruption in high 
places. His report was tabled before 
Parliament six days later. After an 
extensive debate on it, the prime minis-
ter successfully moved a motion to the 
effect that a commission of inquiry 
would be appointed by cabinet to look 
into the report then submit their find-
ings to cabinet. Unhappy with the way 
Parliament dealt with his report, as he 
believed Parliament should have 
referred it to Parliament’s Public 
Accounts Committee, the chief auditor 
sued the legislative assembly, the attor-
ney-general (on behalf of the prime 
minister and government), and individ-
ual members of the commission of 
inquiry on 30 June 1995. Chief Justice 
Sapolu’s judgment, handed down on 
23 January 1996, dismissed the chief 
auditor’s claims against Parliament 
and the government. However, the 
claim relating to the issue of natural justice was upheld. The chief auditor 
appealed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Court of Appeal, which upheld 
Sapolu’s judgment on 17 September 
1996 (SO, 6 Oct 1996).
In Parliament’s last session of 1996, 
the government tabled a bill to reduce 
the tenure of office of future chief 
auditors. Article 97(3) of the Constitu-
tion states that the chief auditor “shall 
hold office until he reaches the age of 
sixty years.” The bill allows future 
chief auditors to hold that office for a 
three-year term. The government’s 
argument, according to the prime min-
ister, is that “[t]hese changes will 
ensure that in future, a Chief Auditor 
who is a servant of Parliament will not 
be able to bring a lawsuit against Par-
liament for doing its job and that if he 
does Parliament will be able to deal 
with the matter immediately and effec-
tively” (quoted in Savali, 13 Dec 
1996). It would also bring the term of 
that office in line with current two-
year terms for special posts, which are 
reserved for heads of government 
departments and organizations. Fur-
thermore, it would give future chief 
auditors an opportunity to leave the 
post if they so decide. On the other 
hand, should they want to seek 
another three-year term they can 
always reapply.
Interested members of the public 
and opposition members of Parliament 
disagreed with the government. They 
argued that the amendment bill did not 
fool anyone, as it was clear the govern-
ment wanted to keep future chief audi-
tors under control so that, among 
other things, they would not again be 
an embarrassment to the government. 
Therefore the bill put the chief audi-
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5 March 1997). On the issue of bring-
ing the office of chief auditor in line 
with special posts, critics argued that
[t]his will bring the holder in line with 
the rest where he will do as the govern-
ment dictates. How can the chief audi-
tor perform his duties effectively in such 
a situation? With independence taken 
from this office, it becomes a shell full 
of nothing lorded over by cronies who 
blindly follow the status quo. We might 
as well just forget about checks and bal-
ances, allow corruption to pile up to the 
sky, and injustice to squeeze life out of 
this country. (SO, 5 March 1997)
[This] development seems to ensure that 
the chief auditor will no longer be able 
to investigate members of cabinet. . . . It 
follows that government’s accountabil-
ity to the public can no longer be 
assured as it would be impossible for 
any auditor under the new conditions to 
insist on it. (SO, 13 March 1997)
The leader of the opposition, Tupua 
Tamasese Efi, argued that the amend-
ment takes away from Parliament the 
power to dismiss the auditor and then 
vest that power in cabinet (SO, 9 
March 1997). Opposition members 
who spoke on the amendment claimed 
that “the passage of the bill did not 
bode well for democracy.” The chief 
auditor’s reaction was “Extraordinary 
passage but predictable. I would have 
thought further debate would be help-
ful to the people” (SO, 13 March 
1997). The amendment bill was passed 
into law on 12 March 1997 by thirty-
six votes to eleven (Savali, 14 March 
1997). Thereafter the government 
assured Parliament and the public that 
the current chief auditor (who has 
been suspended without pay since 8 March 1996 [SO, 6 Oct 1996]) could 
reapply if he wished (SO, 13 March 
1997). The chief auditor has yet to 
make a decision on that issue. He is 
more concerned about his lawsuit 
against the government on issues relat-
ing to natural justice.
Vaiusu is one of the villages in the 
Faleata West constituency. According 
to the government, representatives of 
Vaiusu had asked the current prime 
minister some time back for land total-
ing 396 acres at Tuana‘imato (a village 
adjacent to and just inland of Vaiusu) 
to be handed over to them (Savali, 11 
Dec 1996), as the government had 
done for other villages where part of 
their traditional lands—like Vaiusu—
had previously been wstec land (SO, 
18 Oct 1996). Because that was the 
only piece of land where the village 
people could grow their gardens of 
banana, ta‘amû, and so forth, it was 
important that the government 
allowed them the free use of that land. 
After all, they argued, Tuana‘imato 
was part of the traditional lands that 
had been taken away from them dur-
ing the times of the Samoan wars and 
unscrupulous grab for land (by for-
eigners) in the mid and late 1800s (SO, 
16 Oct 1996). When New Zealand 
took over the administration of West-
ern Sâmoa in 1914, lands of which 
Tuana‘imato was part came under its 
control as New Zealand Reparation 
Estates. With the relinquishing by New 
Zealand of political control to the 
Samoans in 1962, those lands came 
under the control of the Western 
Sâmoa Trust Estate. Not long ago, the 
hrpp government created the Western 
Sâmoa Land Board to be in charge of 
all wstec lands.
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sympathetic to Vaiusu’s request, he 
was not prepared to give up the 
Tuana‘imato land as the government 
already had plans for it. Instead, the 
government gave them, free, govern-
ment lands at Laloanea and Tanu-
mapua, which were farther inland 
from Tuana‘imato. Lands at these sites 
were subsequently divided by Vaiusu 
villagers among themselves (Savali,
16 Oct 1996). However, because these 
lands were farther inland than 
Tuana‘imato land, among other rea-
sons, Vaiusu villagers gradually drifted 
back to Tuana‘imato land and 
replanted it. Early in October 1996, 
the Western Sâmoa Land Board started 
clearing Tuana‘imato land to build a 
recreation park for the use of people 
near that area. An iron fence was 
erected to seal off the area. At this 
stage, on 13 October, Vaiusu villagers 
tore down the fence. Galvanized posts 
that had been cemented into the 
ground were pulled out and scattered 
alongside the road. Police officers were 
immediately on the scene. The incident 
erupted into gunfire, and six villagers 
were taken into police custody (SO, 18 
Oct 1996). As the situation worsened, 
the prime minister ordered the police 
to leave the area until further negotia-
tions could take place. When the area 
was vacated, Vaiusu villagers reoccu-
pied the area and continued planting 
their food crops (SO, 16 Oct 1996).
The government argued that the 
reoccupation by Vaiusu of Tuana‘i-
mato and, more important, the revived 
urgency to have Tuana‘imato lands 
handed back to them had been encour-
aged by candidates in the last elections. 
The candidates promised Vaiusu voters that if they voted for them, one of the 
first things they would do when they 
were elected would be to have 
Tuana‘imato lands returned to them 
(Savali, 16 Oct 1996). The government 
blamed these candidates and Vaiusu 
villagers for the current stalemate over 
the Tuina‘imato issue. It also argued 
that Vaiusu people were unreasonable, 
because not only were the lands public 
lands that belonged to all people of the 
country (SO, 18 Oct 1996), but the 
government also offered them land 
elsewhere at no cost. Meanwhile, there 
is a general fear among the public 
about possible injuries to innocent 
people resulting from the dispute. In 
early August 1997, stone throwing at 
public vehicles passing by Tuana‘imato 
road had injured some people. Ironi-
cally, one of the Vaiusu women was 
injured by the latest round of stone-
throwing at public vehicles (SO, 1 Aug 
1997). Furthermore, there is frustra-
tion among the traveling public at not 
being able to use the public road 
(which is much better and shorter than 
alternative routes) that runs through 
the disputed lands. Though in legal 
terms the government could do what it 
wished with public lands like those 
under dispute, the issue of lands being 
taken away from their traditional 
owners during colonial times is still 
worthy of debate.
On 7 April 1997, Jin Jipei, a Chi-
nese national, arrived at Faleolo air-
port. While processing Jipei’s arrival 
papers the immigration officer on duty 
noticed that Jipei was traveling on a 
Western Samoan passport with his 
own name on it. As Jipei’s passport 
was signed by a person who was not 
an immigration officer in Apia, the 
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informed his boss (Mr B) about it by 
phone. Mr B’s response made the 
immigration officer suspicious that 
some secrets relating to the issuance of 
passports to people who were not 
Samoan citizens had been confined to 
a small circle of senior immigration 
officers. On the following day, the 
immigration officer and Mr B were 
invited to a meeting with the prime 
minister. The incident sparked allega-
tions in the media linking the govern-
ment to what became known as the 
passport scandal (SO, 7 May 1997).
Chinese arrivals such as Michael 
Zhou confirmed that Western
Samoan passports were being adver-
tised in Hong Kong for ws$59,800 
(us$26,000). Zhou himself, who 
arrived in Apia on 23 May 1996, paid 
ws$20,400 (us$9,000) for his Western 
Samoan visa (SO, 4 May 1997). The 
passport scandal revealed a number of 
matters that up till then were not 
known to the Samoan public. Among 
them: that questionable Western 
Samoan passports had been issued at 
places outside the Apia Immigration 
Office for large sums of money; that 
some of the Western Samoan passports 
that had mysteriously disappeared in 
the past had found their way into the 
possession of non-Samoan citizens (SO, 
11 May 1997; 12 June 1997); and that 
both the present and the past govern-
ments were linked to the granting of 
Western Samoan citizenships, thereby 
legalizing the issuance of passports. 
When the leader of the opposition 
questioned the prime minister’s 
involvement in the passport scandal in 
Parliament, the prime minister 
defended his actions by blaming the opposition leader for starting the 
whole thing when, as prime minister, 
he granted citizenship to a Chinese 
national in early 1982, just before 
losing the prime ministership to the 
current incumbent (SO, 26 June 1997). 
Meanwhile, Jin Jipei’s trial revealed 
that the passport number he had was 
meant for a Samoan citizen whose 
passport had mysteriously disappeared 
in the past (SO, 26 June 1997), and five 
immigration officers including the 
chief immigration officer had been 
suspended pending results of an inves-
tigation by a commission of inquiry 
into the passport scandal (SO, 16 May 
1997). Yet to be made absolutely 
certain, however, are the places (coun-
try, city, etc) where the passports in 
question were issued, the identities of 
those who issued them, the “fees” for 
which the passports were issued, and 
where the money gained from the issue 
of those passports went.
Prime Minister Tofilau Eti moved a 
motion in Parliament on 5 March to 
change the country’s name from West-
ern Sâmoa to Sâmoa (SO, 6 March 
1997). Tofilau argued that “the name 
change would take care of an inconsis-
tency at the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York, where the 
country is known simply as Samoa” 
(SO, 6 March 1997). He blamed the 
leader of the opposition, Tupua 
Tamasese Efi, for having made the 
name change while he was prime min-
ister in 1976. Tupua denied the allega-
tion, saying “I suspect that the name 
change is a red herring” (SO, 9 March 
1997), given the current controversy 
associated with the passport scandal.
Arguments against the motion 
included that by Tupua, who main-
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traditionally offensive. He implied the 
possibility that the name Sâmoa could 
have originated from another part of 
Sâmoa that is not part of Western 
Sâmoa under the current political divi-
sions. In that case, that part of “old” 
Sâmoa (that is, Sâmoa before the polit-
ical division of its islands by Germany 
and the United States in 1900) could 
legitimately object to the change. In 
such a situation, what would our gov-
ernment do? he asked. Furthermore, he 
went on, even though Eastern and 
Western Sâmoa have been independent 
of each other since 1900, they share a 
common culture, a set of traditions, 
and their peoples are related by blood 
(SO, 6 March 1997). Others were of 
the view that a referendum should he 
held before any motion of such a nature 
was tabled. Opposition members of 
Parliament and interested members of 
the public drew attention to the huge 
task that would have to be undertaken 
to remove from official documents, of 
which the constitution is one, the name 
Western and its Samoan translation. 
The counterargument by the govern-
ment is that no such thing would ever 
happen because the eastern islands had 
always been known as American 
Sâmoa, a territory of the United States 
of America. Western Sâmoa legally 
became Sâmoa when Parliament 




SO, Samoa Observer. Apia newspaper.
Savali. Government-owned newspaper.Tokelau
In 1994—the last time a UN mission 
visited Tokelau—a statement known as 
“The Voice of Tokelau” was presented 
to the mission in an effort to articulate 
Tokelau’s view of its long-term 
“dreams and hopes” as it advances 
steadily toward an act of self-determi-
nation (Levine 1996, 200–201). Dur-
ing the year under review further 
strides were made in developing infra-
structure identified in the “Voice of 
Tokelau” as a necessary part of the 
self-government process. Perhaps the 
most dramatic of these was in the area 
of telecommunications.
On 10 April 1997 Tokelau inaugu-
rated its direct-dial telephone and fax 
linkage with the outside world. In 
doing so Tokelau became the last 
country in the world to introduce a 
telephone service, having relied previ-
ously on shortwave radio links to 
Apia. The very first call made using the 
new system was from Ulu-o-Tokelau 
Falima Teao, to New Zealand Prime 
Minister Jim Bolger. Another call made 
by the Ulu that same day was to the 
resident representative of the United 
Nations Development Program in 
Western Sâmoa.
The introduction of a modern tele-
communications system presented 
significant engineering, legal, and 
financial challenges. The total cost of 
the project was nz$3.25 million, of 
which the New Zealand Government 
contributed around $1.6 million and 
Tokelau over $1 million, with the 
remainder funded by the United 
Nations Development Program and 
the International Telecommunication 
Union. Design and construction of the 
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under the oversight of a project 
manager appointed by the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union. The 
Australian telecommunications corpo-
ration, Telstra, installed three satellite 
earth stations, while the aumaga 
(village workforce) in each of Toke-
lau’s three villages assisted the project 
by laying cable ducts and building
the antenna foundations. At Fakaofo, 
the satellite antenna links include a
3-kilometer armored cable laid on the 
lagoon floor, with a joint just inside 
the reef pass. All telephone cables have 
been buried under the road in poly-
vinyl chloride duct pipes sized to allow 
for individual service to every house in 
Tokelau.
Appropriately enough, given the 
importance of these links to the out-
side world, Tokelau’s General Fono 
used the legislative powers conferred 
on it by the Tokelau Amendment Act 
1996 (Levine 1997, 242–244) to estab-
lish a government-owned business 
entity, Telecommunication Tokelau 
Corporation (also known as Teletok), 
in November 1996. This was the first 
exercise of these powers, and it was 
used to establish a basic structure for 
the operation of telecommunications 
systems in Tokelau.
A second infrastructural develop-
ment focused on Tokelau’s transporta-
tion needs. Tokelau does not have an 
air service, and its shipping service has 
been irregular and infrequent. Follow-
ing considerable investigation, the 
New Zealand Government purchased 
a Polish-built freighter, now renamed 
MV Forum Tokelau, which was then 
modified to allow for both passenger 
and freight service on the Apia–Toke-lau run. The purchase and subsequent 
upgrading (at a cost of over nz$1 
million) was made using funds addi-
tional to those allocated by New 
Zealand to Tokelau for budgetary sup-
port (nz$4.3 million) and for project 
assistance (nz$1.4 million). The vessel, 
under the management of the Pacific 
Forum Line, is berthed in Apia and is 
being regarded as an interim solution. 
As with the telephone service, the new 
shipping arrangements raise complex 
problems of finance and manage-
ment—whether the service should be 
subsidized, for instance—and have led 
to the setting up of a further govern-
ment-owned corporation, Transtok. In 
May 1997 the MV Forum Tokelau 
made its first voyage to Tokelau, but 
the long-term challenge is to find a ves-
sel that is fully suited to this service as 
well as to cover freight and passage 
costs from the Tokelauan economy.
A third infrastructural requirement, 
Tokelau’s energy needs, has also begun 
to attract further interest. The current 
system relies on diesel generators, but 
an essential element of the telecommu-
nications project is the need for reli-
able power generation. The use of 
photovoltaic cells as an additional 
energy source is being investigated.
As Tokelau’s integration into the 
international community continues to 
unfold, deepening in stages, efforts 
continue to be made by Tokelauans 
themselves to interpret and expound 
upon Tokelau’s changing circum-
stances. On 25 July 1996, the then 
Ulu, Pio Tuia, the Faipule of Nuku-
nonu, spoke to the UN Special Com-
mittee—only the second time that a 
Faipule had spoken to the Special 
Committee (this had previously 
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third UN Visiting Mission to Tokelau).
Speaking of the infrastructural 
developments, the Ulu sought to put 
these into a Tokelauan perspective. 
“We are part of the world village and 
do not exist in a vacuum. More impor-
tantly, our fragile environment cannot 
support a large population, and we 
therefore have no option but to rely on 
the goodwill of the Government of 
New Zealand to allow our citizens free 
access into that country. That open 
doorway, however, becomes the horns 
of a dilemma for us. If the level of ser-
vices and the quality of life on the 
atolls can no longer attract our people, 
the inevitable decline in our numbers 
could depopulate Tokelau to the extent 
that we can no longer provide a viable 
future for anyone wishing to remain.”
Such comments emphasized Toke-
lau’s economic dependence, a key ele-
ment as it considers further steps 
toward self-government: “The reality 
is . . . that despite our efforts to be self-
reliant to the greatest extent possible, 
Tokelau cannot totally sustain itself 
economically now or post self-determi-
nation. This is one of the most impor-
tant issues in the minds of our people 
as Tokelau makes this journey. This is 
why Tokelau seeks assurances from the 
international community, through the 
United Nations, and New Zealand as 
administering power, that it will not be 
cast off to fend for itself.”
The Ulu’s statement also referred to 
the work being done on a Tokelauan 
constitution, noting that (in the words 
of the General Fono’s Special Constitu-
tion Committee) “a first glimpse” of a 
draft document had now been submit-
ted to the General Fono. This consti-tution-in-the-making emphasizes 
“institutional pillars that have with-
stood the test of time,” but also recog-
nizes “the need where appropriate to 
cover changing times and circum-
stances through the adoption of typi-
cally pragmatic Tokelau solutions.”
In describing Tokelauan develop-
ments, the Ulu noted Tokelau’s “his-
toric aversion to change,” reflecting 
“our situation of villages managing 
their own affairs with little interference 
from the outside world, let alone their 
kin in the next atoll just over the hori-
zon.” As a result, it was “thus a 
notable achievement that our people 
have shown a willingness to embark 
on this constitutional journey.” Char-
acteristically, the speech used mari-
time imagery: “The reality is that the 
Tokelau canoe is in uncharted waters. 
At all times, the capacity of our pad-
dlers to stay the course is being 
tested.”
Notwithstanding New Zealand’s 
administrative powers with respect to 
Tokelau and the United Nations’ inter-
est in developments there, Tokelauans 
not surprisingly seek to maintain con-
trol over the pace and direction of 
change. As the Ulu observed, “We are 
taking on new responsibilities that 
require careful and considered think-
ing. For we wish to find solutions that 
suit our own circumstances. In other 
words this must be a Tokelau-driven 
process.”
Tokelau’s administrator, Lindsay 
Watt, also spoke to the UN Special 
Committee, likewise envisaging a 
Tokelauan journey as he described its 
progress toward self-government.
“No journey from Tokelau is under-
taken lightly. Traditional journeys 
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Commonly two hulls were lashed 
together. . . . Tokelau is embarked on a 
political journey that is as brave as the 
ocean journeys by canoe of old. For 
the first time ever its three atolls—
physically separated by vast expanses 
of high seas and each enjoying sub-
stantial autonomy—seek to come 
together as one family, people and 
nation. This is the realization of what 
has long been sung and dreamt about. 
Quite literally this is a story of nation 
building. It’s a human drama too in 
which a whole people are drawing 
upon the strengths in their own tra-
dition and culture as they shape their 
new national governing arrange-
ments.”
Looking ahead to an eventual act of 
self-determination, note was taken of 
concerns in Tokelau that it might be 
“cut adrift in a post self-determination 
future”—an apprehension that has 
consistently served as a cautionary 
brake on too-rapid progress toward 
change. The administrator empha-
sized these concerns in his summing 
up: “I underline again Tokelau’s 
bottom line: its need for reassurance. 
Local resources simply cannot cover 
adequately the material side of self-
determination and self-government. 
This will be acknowledged in the free 
association formula which is under 
development. . . . for territories as 
small and precariously situated as 
Tokelau, self-determination is not
an end in itself. It is a step—and a
very significant step—in an ongoing 
process.”
On 25 July 1996, the UN Special 
Committee adopted a resolution on the 
“Question of Tokelau,” noting the intention of Tokelau to adopt a free-
association relationship with New 
Zealand in the expectation that New 
Zealand would continue to help “in 
promoting the well-being of its 
people.” At the same time, the com-
mittee saw wider importance in the 
Tokelau experience, noting that “as a 
small island Territory, Tokelau exem-
plifies the situation of most remaining 
Non-Self-Governing Territories,” so 
that “as a case-study pointing to suc-
cessful decolonization, Tokelau has 
wider significance for the United 
Nations as it seeks to complete its 
work in decolonization.” In broadly 
endorsing recent developments in 
Tokelau, specifically the provision of 
legislative and executive powers to 
Tokelau’s national government, the 
special committee also acknowledged 
“Tokelau’s need for reassurance, given 
that local resources cannot adequately 
cover the material side of self-determi-
nation.”
The January 1997 message to the 
General Fono from the administrator 
characterized 1996 as “a year of con-
solidation,” reflecting the end of the 
term of the first Council of Faipule (in 
1995) and the complete change in its 
composition in the January 1996 elec-
tions. The years ahead, 1997 and 
1998, were seen as “years of accep-
tance and implementation,” as the 
system of government and administra-
tion, and developments in telecommu-
nications and shipping, become more 
established.
The nation-building momentum has 
also been evident in progress toward a 
written constitution. Significantly, the 
document taking shape has been 
drafted in Tokelauan, not English. The 
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Fono, providing a draft document for 
further discussion. It is possible that 
some ideas in the draft document with 
broad support in the villages may be 
implemented, with a full constitution 
being elaborated in a step-by-step 
approach. In language, style, and sub-
stance, Tokelauans appear to be devel-
oping an approach to governance 
distinct from the experience of other 
entities in which decolonization has 
taken place.
The return to Tokelau of its previ-
ously Apia-based public service has 
made possible a strengthening of vil-
lage leadership and institutions. 
Reductions in the size of the public 
service at the national level are now 
regarded as part of a process of “re-
empowerment” for local leadership. 
This involves village elders learning 
new management skills, while village 
work forces acquire new skills and 
knowledge. The intent is to have a 
small number of public servants at the 
national level, providing services only 
where individual villages are unable to 
do so. Tokelau’s new national govern-
ment is to be small, active only where 
required.
The idea of public service functions 
being delivered in and by the village is 
not without its complexities. Is it 
possible for a person to be working for 
the village in the morning and for the 
nation in the afternoon? With schools, 
hospitals, and public works run by the 
villages, themselves subject to national 
standards and with some national 
funding, it may be possible to dispense 
with such departments at the national 
level, a further step in the erosion of the size and influence of the Tokelau 
public service. A competing power 
center when it was located outside 
Tokelau, its future seems to be linked 
to the success of the program for “re-
empowering the villages.” This 
depends on the capacity of villages to 
undertake tasks currently carried out 
by the public service, including various 
financial and organizational activities: 
running a budget; managing funds; 
providing jobs; having the skills to 
provide the necessary services.
It is emphasized that “re-empower-
ing” does not mean simply going back 
to the past (although elders will have 
more power); “re-empowering” now 
requires up-to-date skills and the 
involvement of all those living in the 
villages. At present, village government 
employs just one official—the secre-
tary to the village council (the tau-
pulega); strengthening the villages 
represents a major step in the return to 
Tokelauans of a capacity to govern 
themselves. Accordingly, meetings held 
in Tokelau in May 1997 were devoted 
to working toward a smaller national 
public service and an enhanced village 
service. These meetings were attended 
by the three Faipule, village representa-
tives, the administrator, and the two 
Tokelau public service commissioners. 
A new catch-phrase—“capacity build-
ing”—describes the work being done 
(or needing to be done) to strengthen 
the human and organizational skills in 
the villages, as preparations are made 
to transfer responsibilities to them.
The theme of a distinctive Toke-
lauan approach to governance 
emerged at the Caribbean Regional 
Seminar to Review the Political, Eco-
nomic and Social Conditions in the 
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Territories, held at Antigua and Bar-
buda on 21–23 May 1997. Tokelau 
was represented by Kelihiano Kalolo, a 
Tokelau teacher recently involved in a 
curriculum review in Tokelau and a 
doctoral candidate in anthropology at 
the University of Auckland (he will be 
Tokelau’s first PhD when he receives 
his degree). His participation at the 
seminar reflects the importance of 
links between Tokelauans in Tokelau 
and those living outside the islands.
In emphasizing that Tokelau was 
“avoiding” independence “as a future 
option,” Mr Kalolo described Tokelau 
as striving for “new, unique and inno-
vative solutions” in its effort to be as 
self-reliant as possible (in economic, 
social, political, and constitutional 
terms). Tokelau’s nation-building 
effort was described in this way: “We 
are enjoying a freedom to come up 
with our model of government based 
on our old and current way of life with 
a view to the needs of generations who 
will choose to live on these small 
islands. We are carving a canoe from 
freshly felled logs, not fashioning from 
old steel in the dockyards of London.”
Reflecting on his own experience, 
Mr Kalolo described Tokelau as a 
“cultural reservoir” for all Tokelauans, 
noting that Tokelau can “continue to 
call on the pool of its qualified and 
educated people who live permanently 
in New Zealand.” He told the confer-
ence that Tokelau’s agenda for the 
future seems clear: as Tokelau changes, 
and forms itself into a nation, it is 
stressing continuity as well. “We must 
ensure that these activities in the for-
mation of a nation are firmly based if 
they are to have any meaning and rele-vance. This is why we are returning to 
the village—the center of all things in 
our culture. To re-empower the vil-
lages. To make them strong. To give 
them strength in order to support and 
give birth to a nation.”
A further opportunity for an elabo-
ration of the Tokelauan approach took 
place when, on 12 June 1997, New 
Zealand’s Deputy Permanent Repre-
sentative Peter Rider spoke before the 
UN Special Committee. He referred to 
the two “expressions of Tokelau’s 
voice” referred to earlier—the Ulu’s 
appearance before the special commit-
tee in June 1996, and the address at 
the regional seminar by Tokelau’s 
special representative.
Mr Kalolo’s “vivid expression” was 
interpreted as a rejection of the West-
minster system (“old steel”) for a fresh 
approach (“a new canoe from freshly 
felled logs”) to the problem of govern-
ment design. The entire Tokelau 
approach to the character of its own 
institutions of government reflects the 
unique circumstances of the New 
Zealand–Tokelau relationship. As Mr 
Rider stressed, “the Administering 
Power has never been physically resi-
dent, the style of administration has 
been notably light handed, each village 
has remained largely autonomous, and 
there has been no pattern of settlement 
from outside.” By contrast, “had self-
government in Tokelau been develop-
ing within a more traditional colonial 
pattern, Tokelau would not have had 
its present freedom—the opportunity 
to set the conditions and the goals. 
Past decolonisation practice in territo-
ries such as this has been to export the 
known governmental model (com-
monly Westminster based), assume 
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allow a certain local input into its evo-
lution, but never really to start from 
scratch.” It is this freedom to start 
anew (notwithstanding a reliance on 
Tokelauan values and traditions) that 
lends fascination to Tokelau’s current 
and recent experience. As Mr Rider 
observed, “Tokelau necessarily has to 
throw this familiar approach on its 
head. It has to find an alternative—
charting its own course, drawing upon 
its own tradition, developing its ideas 
in its own language.”
There is a link between all these 
developments—between Tokelau’s 
capacity to govern itself and the provi-
sion of basic infrastructure; between 
the ability to run basic services in the 
villages at an acceptable level and the 
ability (for instance) to communicate 
quickly and easily with suppliers in 
Apia and administrators in Wellington.
stephen levine
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During the last year, the seemingly vio-
lent abuse of legal power in Tonga 
attracted widespread international 
media attention. The most sensational 
event was the Legislative Assembly’s 
imprisonment of three men in Septem-
ber 1996 for contempt of parliamen-
tary procedure. The negative publicity 
that such events attract tends to mask 
the quiet, steady application of the law 
by commoners which, upheld by mem-
bers of the judiciary, defends their 
rights of citizenship. The three men, 
two journalists, Kalafi Moala and Filo 
‘Akau‘ola, the editor and deputy
editor of the newspaper Taimi ‘o 
Tonga, together with the Number One 
People’s Representative for Tongatapu, 
the controversial ‘Akilisi Pohiva, were 
sentenced to imprisonment for thirty 
days from 20 September 1996, because 
they reported that the Legislative 
Assembly was to impeach the minister 
of justice. The information, prema-
turely published in the newspaper,
was leaked from privileged parliamen-
tary papers before the motion had 
been tabled in Parliament, let alone 
discussed. For this, the three were 
imprisoned.
Soon afterward, on 24 September, 
the Legislative Assembly did vote 11–
10 in favor of a writ of impeachment 
against Minister of Justice and Attor-
ney-General the Honourable Tevita 
Tupou. He had taken leave of absence, 
without the permission of the Speaker, 
to travel to Atlanta, Georgia, as the 
head of Tonga’s Olympic team. It is 
alleged that he neglected his parlia-
mentary duties while in receipt of 
salary. The newspaper was at fault
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House had reached a decision.
The men’s imprisonment created an 
uproar. On 7 October, Puisne Judge 
Jack Lewis, acting in the absence of
the chief justice, confirmed the legality 
of the imprisonment, and declined a 
second application for habeas corpus. 
By 14 October, Chief Justice Nigel 
Hampton had returned. During a
third application for a writ of habeas 
corpus, filed this time by a New 
Zealand lawyer sent by the Common-
wealth Press Union to investigate the 
lawfulness of the men’s restraint, 
Hampton found that the House had 
not followed its own rules of conduct: 
it had not carried out preliminary 
hearings, nor made recommendations 
to the men concerning contempt. 
Because the prisoners had been 
deprived of their constitutional protec-
tion of due process, the judge declared 
the procedure adopted by the House 
“unfair and unconstitutional,” and 
ordered the immediate release of the 
prisoners. They had been in prison for 
twenty-six of their thirty-day sentence, 
during which Pohiva reportedly had 
suffered repeated asthma attacks.
The chief justice’s quashing of the 
decision shattered the belief that the 
court had no right to interfere in the 
internal proceedings of Parliament, 
and brought the judiciary into direct 
confrontation with the legislature. The 
judge pointed out that because Tonga 
has a written constitution, the Legisla-
tive Assembly does not have the privi-
lege of supremacy over the courts, as 
enjoyed in Britain (particularly since 
the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II in 
1679) because Britain does not have a 
written constitution. He rested his case on Clause 90 of the Tongan Constitu-
tion, which states that “The Supreme 
Court shall have jurisdiction in all 
cases in Law and Equity arising under 
the Constitution and Laws of the King-
dom” (Lâtûkefu 1975, 135).
This case has raised the serious issue 
of the independence and jurisdiction
of the judiciary. Minister of Police
the Honourable Clive Edwards is 
reported to have said that he feared 
that the overturning of the parliamen-
tary decision by the court could have 
resulted in a breakdown of law and 
order, although it is not immediately 
clear why this should be so. The 
Speaker of the House, rather unwisely, 
told a journalist that, if the chief justice 
ordered the release of the prisoners, 
the Legislative Assembly would take 
action against him for overturning its 
decision. His remarks, duly published 
in the Taimi ‘o Tonga, earned him the 
charge of contempt of court from the 
puisne judge, and the chief justice 
immediately removed himself from the 
bench on the matter in contention.
The ruling of the chief justice may 
eventually be examined in the highest 
Court of Appeal which, in Tonga, is 
the Privy Council with the King at its 
head. The revelation that certain noble 
members of Parliament believe the 
Legislative Assembly can overrule the 
judiciary will almost certainly have 
serious legal repercussions and gener-
ate much-needed debate on issues of 
procedure and the proper distribution 
of authority.
As it turned out, on 30 September 
the impeachment hearing had to be 
deferred until the 97th Legislative 
Assembly the following year because, 
on 3 October, about a month earlier 
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abruptly brought the 1996 session to a 
close. This move prevented discussion 
of annual reports from two ministerial 
offices, as well as the hearing of the 
impeachment of the minister of justice 
that had been accepted from the 
people’s representatives by the House 
only four days earlier. It is part of the 
royal prerogative to set the dates of the 
opening and closing of parliament. The 
King reportedly made the decision 
because only two or three ministers 
would be in the House during October 
and November, the others being away 
overseas attending meetings.
The House had no option but to 
accept the King’s decision, but has put 
the minister’s impeachment as a top 
priority for the next session with the 
hearing set for 8 July 1997. Masao 
Paasi, the Number Two People’s Rep-
resentative for Vava‘u, who in August 
had made history by being the first 
representative member of the House to 
present a Bill (for an Amendment to 
the Criminal Law Act), was selected as 
the prosecutor of the motion.
The use of the impeachment provi-
sions of the constitution by representa-
tives of the people against cabinet 
ministers, which occurred first in 
1940, has been much debated in recent 
years because ministers of the Crown 
are chosen by the King. The editor of 
Matangi Tonga underlined the impor-
tance of Parliament’s legal rights: “The 
fact that the House can impeach a 
Cabinet Minister proves a point that 
the Parliament can hold Ministers 
accountable for their actions and that 
they are also accountable to the parlia-
ment” (Matangi Tonga, Jan–Mar 
1997, 3). The hearing promises to be a protracted debate on these rights, and 
also on the rights of the Legislative 
Assembly in relation to the judiciary.
The other notable development is 
the degree of cohesion evident among 
the nine people’s representatives. Fre-
quently, in recent years, they have been 
markedly divided by rifts that have 
diminished their public credibility and 
their effectiveness in Parliament. The 
clash of temperaments has been toned 
down by the presence among them of 
older, experienced, and respected poli-
ticians, such as the newly elected Mahe 
Tupouniua, a former minister of 
finance. Now, at least, they keep talk-
ing to one another. Their new har-
mony undoubtedly will facilitate the 
presentation, if not the passage, of 
reformist legislation during the current 
parliamentary session.
In addition to the positive attitude 
evident among the people’s representa-
tives, there are signs that some newly 
elected nobles’ representatives, for 
example, the Honourable Kalaniuvalu 
and the Honourable Tu‘ivakano, who 
were elected in 1996, are not markedly 
opposed to the people’s representa-
tives, and may support reformist 
moves to some extent. In all, the 
potential alignments between some 
nobles’ representatives and people’s 
representatives augur well for reform, 
although perhaps not as much as the 
more optimistic of the people’s repre-
sentatives would hope for. The debates 
in the House, however, are likely to 
prove more constructive and less dis-
rupted by personal rancor than in 
previous years.
People favoring reform are also 
expecting a great deal from the pres-
ence in cabinet of Dr Giulio Masasso 
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thirty-two, was appointed minister of 
Labour, Commerce, Industries, and 
Tourism, immediately upon his com-
pletion of a doctoral degree in Japan. 
Dr Paunga, like his father, the deputy 
prime minister, is a commoner. At the 
age of seventy-three, Minister of 
Health Dr Tapa stepped down after 
forty-nine years in public service, but 
the ministerial position has not yet 
been filled.
Whether these new appointments 
and alignments constitute a real cause 
for optimism among aspiring reform-
ers remains to be seen. At the opening 
of the annual convention of the Pacific 
Islands News Association in August, 
the minister of police announced yet 
again that Tonga was the most demo-
cratic of nations because the freedoms 
had been granted to its citizens by its 
first monarch and were enshrined by 
law in the constitution. ‘Akilisi Pohiva 
merely replied that this was so, but,
for social and cultural reasons, many 
of the common people still felt too 
constrained to claim these individual 
freedoms.
The cynical or sage among the 
reformers remain acutely aware of the 
numbers still stacked against them, 
and the strength of their opponents. 
Were some of the nobles’ representa-
tives to break rank with cabinet mem-
bers in order to support the people’s 
representatives, or some cabinet mem-
bers support reformist legislation com-
ing from the Legislative Assembly, the 
achievement of the basic reforms that 
are called for in the Tongan system 
would still be a painfully long process, 
unlikely to achieve its aims without 
royal assent. The reforms could be implemented much more swiftly and 
effectively from the top. The King, 
however, is believed to be even less 
enchanted with the desires and aims of 
the political reformers than he was five 
or six years ago, because of the disre-
spectful things that some of them have 
said about him. The abrasive manner 
in which the Crown Prince has been 
addressed in Parliament has also 
eroded the royal support for reform 
that was once quite discernible.
The idea put forward by the reform-
ers, that all thirty members of Parlia-
ment should be elected by the people 
and that the monarch should choose 
his cabinet ministers from among their 
number, might have been considered 
favorably by the King in 1991, but will 
not be now. It would meet also with 
considerable opposition from the 
nobles, many of whom fear they might 
not be elected and would thereby lose 
more social standing than their own 
behavior has lost them already. Most 
of the nobles remain very conscious of 
their position in the kingdom, which 
depends largely on royal favor and 
appointment to state-associated posi-
tions, and do not want to see it further 
eroded by popular reforms.
kerry james
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Since this is the first review of Tuvalu 
to be published in The Contemporary 
Pacific, some basic information is pro-
vided before the events of 1996–97 are 
discussed.
Independent from Britain in 1978 
after nearly eight decades of colonial 
rule, Tuvalu, formerly the Ellice 
Islands and ruled jointly as part of the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, 
consists of eight main small islands. 
The total land area of 26 square 
kilometers is spread over 900,000 
square kilometers of the central 
Pacific. The highest point in the coun-
try is no more than four meters above 
sea level, and most areas are lower. 
The adverse consequences of global 
warming, sea-level rise, and the threat 
of natural hazards are matters of con-
siderable concern. Of the total popula-
tion of 10,114, about 2,000 live or 
work overseas and over a third are on 
the capital island of Funafuti, making 
it one of the most densely populated 
atolls in the Pacific. The skewed popu-
lation distribution, exacerbated by a 
high rate of natural increase, puts con-
siderable pressure on economic and 
social services.
Britain’s Queen Elizabeth is Tuvalu’s 
head of state, locally represented by a 
Tuvaluan governor-general whose 
functions are mainly ceremonial. Par-
liament consists of a single chamber of 
twelve members elected by universal 
suffrage. Of the eight main islands, 
four return two candidates each and 
the rest one each. Niulakita, the ninth 
island, is not considered a separate 
electoral district. The legislature is 
presided over by a Speaker elected by members. Elections are held every four 
years. Cabinet consists of the prime 
minister and four other ministers, and 
cabinet meetings are attended by two 
ex-officio members: the secretary to 
the government and the attorney-
general. The prime minister is elected 
by Parliament from among its mem-
bers, and in turn he appoints the min-
isters. There are no political parties in 
the western sense, but those not with 
the government form an unofficial 
opposition. The current constitution, 
adopted in 1986, replaced the indepen-
dence constitution of 1978. Tuvalu is 
not a member of the United Nations, 
but it is a member of a number of
UN specialized agencies and the Asian 
Development Bank, and is a signa-
tory to many UN treaties and con-
ventions. It has special status within 
the Commonwealth and is a full mem-
ber of many of the Pacific regional 
organizations.
Because it is small, remote from 
markets, and lacking exploitable 
natural resources, Tuvalu’s economy 
suffers from many constraints. These 
include limited skilled human 
resources; severe problems in adminis-
tration, transportation, and communi-
cations; and inadequate social and 
economic infrastructure. Tuvalu 
depends highly on development aid 
assistance for most of its capital for-
mation and technical assistance. Tradi-
tional donors include Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, the Asian Development 
Bank, UN specialized agencies, the 
European Union, and regional organ-
izations. The Tuvalu Trust Fund—the 
first to be established in a developing 
country predominantly through dona-
tions from other countries—was set up 
political reviews • polynesia 241in 1987 to provide a source of revenue 
to the government in order to improve 
and strengthen its finances, improve 
social services, and help develop the 
economy. With initial contributions 
totalling a$27.1 million, it has grown 
to a$45 million in the first ten years. 
Lavish government and community 
celebrations, together with a five-day 
public holiday commemorating the 
fund’s tenth anniversary in June 1997, 
must have made a sizeable dent in the 
fund’s revenues.
In the year under review, Tuvalu 
underwent a most stressful period 
politically as it grappled with issues of 
governance involving traditional 
values and foreign political systems. 
The coalition government led by Prime 
Minister Kamuta Latasi had initiated a 
process to implement major constitu-
tional changes. These included chang-
ing the national flag, preparing the 
country for a republican type of gov-
ernment, introducing legislative 
reforms to effectively support national 
development programs, and making 
amendments to the electoral law. The 
impetus of public sector and local gov-
ernment reforms was being success-
fully maintained through the personal 
interest of Latasi as minister responsi-
ble for these two areas.
In July 1996, Latasi and his official 
entourage paid a visit to Niutao 
Island—the home of former Governor-
General Tomu Sione, who was dis-
missed in 1994 after being “unwisely” 
appointed by former Prime Minister 
Bikenibeu Paeniu. The people of 
Niutao had been bitter about the dis-
missal, and the purpose of the historic 
meeting was to try and reconcile any 
differences by applying traditional ways of consultation, dialogue, and 
consensus. The matter was amicably 
settled, and relationships between the 
government and the Niutao people 
were normalized.
The agreement allowing Asia Pacific 
Telecommunications to rent many of 
Tuvalu’s international telephone num-
bers came under heavy criticism from 
the opposition in 1996. The main 
reason was that some of these numbers 
were being used outside Tuvalu for 
“phone sex,” a practice that critics say 
is unchristian. However, the agreement 
earns much-needed foreign exchange 
for the country.
As the country geared up for the 
eighteenth independence anniversary 
on 1 October 1996, the government 
and the opposition found themselves 
in the middle of an unprecedented 
political crisis. The opposition 
demanded the resignation or dismissal 
of Prime Minister Latasi and his min-
isters. The crisis had started several 
months before the independence cele-
brations. Deputy Prime Minister 
Otinielu Tausi had been at loggerheads 
with Minister of Finance Koloa Talake 
for some time. The latter had a litany 
of queries probing the former’s failure 
to submit his tax returns over a num-
ber of years, excessive claims for travel 
allowances, disputed payments for 
parliamentary privileges, and pur-
chase of departmental stores from the 
deputy prime minister’s private shop 
contrary to government purchasing 
procedures. Tausi had failed to submit 
satisfactory responses to the Ministry 
of Finance and was demanding that 
the minister of finance should either be 
moved away from the ministry or be 
dismissed. Tausi stopped attending 
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back to the fold, and under mounting 
pressure from other colleagues, Latasi 
dismissed Tausi from public office on 
16 September 1996. As this was the 
first time that a cabinet minister was 
dismissed in such a manner, Tuvaluans 
witnessed the exercise of such political 
powers with a mixture of astonishment 
and trepidation.
Tausi accused other ministers of 
similarly abusing parliamentary privi-
leges. He had also been very discon-
tented with efforts by Latasi to 
persuade the opposition leader, Biken-
ibeu Paeniu, to join their group with-
out discussing the matter first with all 
members of the coalition. Although 
strongly denied by Latasi, there may 
well be some truth in the assertion, as 
Paeniu was not only often seen during 
this period with the prime minister, but 
his performance in Parliament against 
the government had suddenly become 
less effective. Tausi joined the opposi-
tion, accompanied by Tomasi Puapua, 
the Speaker of Parliament and former 
prime minister. This left the govern-
ment in the minority. With the change 
in fortune and the possibility of lead-
ing the new government, Bikenibeu 
Paeniu disassociated himself from 
Latasi and launched a vicious cam-
paign against the government. The 
opposition canvassed strongly for the 
immediate resignation of Latasi and 
solicited the interventions of the over-
seas media, the governor-general, 
island communities, island chiefs, and 
elders, as well as the civil service. The 
opposition petitioned the governor-
general on 27 September 1996, but the 
governor-general advised that he was 
not empowered to address such a political situation. The constitution 
provides that the prime minister may 
be removed from office due to a lack 
of majority supporting him only by 
way of a motion of no-confidence 
moved in a session in Parliament. But
a session of Parliament may only be 
called on the advice of the prime 
minister.
Latasi was not to be intimidated 
into resigning and indicated that the 
opposition should await the session of 
Parliament, set for December, at which 
time it could move a motion of no 
confidence. He advised that it was con-
stitutionally legal for him to remain in 
his post until the December session of 
Parliament. This angered the opposi-
tion, who claimed that Latasi was 
hungry for power and argued that 
since they had the majority, it was 
incumbent on him to resign immedi-
ately. Alternatively, the opposition 
members argued, a session of Parlia-
ment should be called at once—and 
not delayed to December—so that 
Latasi’s minority government could be 
voted out of power. The opposition 
increased its attacks on the govern-
ment and declared a war of scathing 
personal remarks against Latasi, 
including putting considerable pres-
sure on island communities to rise 
against the government.
In an unprecedented move, the 
opposition intervened in the public 
service and advised the public service 
commission and the budget committee 
(which was then preparing the 1997 
budget) to cease all functions until
the opposition had installed a new 
government.
In responding to opposition calls for 
support, the four most populous 
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fetau, and Funafuti) said that the polit-
ical crisis would be resolved in accor-
dance with the constitution when 
Parliament met in December 1997.
Defeated in the historic motion of 
no confidence on 18 December 1996, 
the Latasi regime was succeeded by the 
government of Bikenibeu Paeniu, 
formerly prime minister from 1989 to 
1993. Although it had only to rule for 
the remaining year before the general 
elections, Paeniu’s new government 
started off with a long and ambitious 
list of the things it wanted accom-
plished. Paeniu’s desire to do many 
things all at once is exemplified by
his “Vision 2015” policy statement, 
delivered to Parliament in April 1997. 
Critics argued that the document 
lacked focus and, contrary to its title, 
failed to provide any vision.
Paeniu’s government immediately 
withdrew the new flag and returned 
the country’s old flag. It halted all 
efforts to prepare the people for a 
republican political system, leaving the 
constitutional lawyer recruited specifi-
cally to assist with constitutional 
changes grossly underemployed. It 
sacked the chairman of the Public 
Service Commission for standing up 
for the constitutional rights of the 
commission at the time when the then 
opposition demanded that the commis-
sioners to cease all their functions until 
a new government was formed. A 
couple of investigatory inquiries were 
conducted into public servants sus-
pected of having been involved in a 
political way during the period of the 
political crisis. The question remains, 
however, whether the government 
would penalize a civil servant who may have acted in a political way that 
was advantageous to a member of its 
team, or whether they are looking only 
for those who may have acted against 
their political interests.
As prime minister, Paeniu was 
better placed to ingratiate himself with 
the Niutao community over his 
“unwise” appointment of Tomu Sione 
as governor-general in 1993. Special 
efforts were made to find employment 
for him. Paeniu appointed him as a 
local government consultant after New 
Zealand rejected Tuvalu’s attempts to 
employ him as the Tuvalu liaision 
officer based in Auckland. Although a 
similar exercise had been carried out in 
1995, the government conducted a 
People’s Congress on the island of 
Niutao in late June 1997, with about a 
hundred delegates from the govern-
ment and various island communities 
to look at reforms in local government. 
The second member of Parliament 
from Niutao Island, Baueri Irata, in 
addition to his parliamentary duties, 
was appointed on a full-time basis to 
replace the chairman of the public 
sector review committee, thus cement-
ing further Paeniu’s relations with the 
Niutao community.
The political landscape during the 
year under review was dominated by 
increasing “obsessive personalism” in 
the various policies and actions of the 
political leaders. Domestic politics has 
increasingly become more and more 
complex, raising grave doubts about 
whether the “peaceful paradise” appel-
lation is any longer appropriate for the 
country.
tauaasa taafaki
